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← 450 F.2d 1227 - Action, Percy Green v. Rowland E. Gannon

Action, Percy Green v. Rowland E. Gannon’s Empirical Analysis

450 F.2d 1227 · 1971

Citation profile

150
cited by 150 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
6
states following
August 2008
most recently cited

75 federal appellate · 17 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 150 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2008 · most notably McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976), Robert C. Hahn v. Francis W. Sargent (1975)

75 federal appellate · 17 district · 5 state decisions

8801971198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (Civil Rights Act of 1866)

Relies on Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · Bell v. Hood · Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. · Griffin v. Breckenridge

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 150 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The defendants have a right to voice their opinion that the plaintiffs have not fulfilled their obligation to the black community. The defendants also have a right to make requests upon the plaintiffs if such requests are not joined with threats to disrupt church services and are not otherwise unlawful. The fact that the requests or opinions may be offensive to the parishioners does not render them outside the protection of the First Amendment. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 , 91 S.Ct. 1575 , 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 , 90 S.Ct. 1312 , 25 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 , 89 S.Ct. 1354 , 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969). As the Supreme Court has said: “ ... [A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, ... is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest....” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 , 4, 69 S.Ct. 894 , 896, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““. . . [The District Court’s] statement [that § 1985(3) provides only for damages] . . . seems clearly to express [its] view that it would be powerless to enter an injunction in the event the plaintiff’s proof showed he was otherwise entitled to it. We think that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. [Alfred H.] Mayer Co., [ 392 U.S. 409 , 88 S.Ct. 2186 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 ] also resolved this issue. As we have pointed out above, Section 1982, which was before the court for consideration, gave no authority for the granting* of an injunction or the granting of damages. Nevertheless the court held that both powers would be available to a court upon proof of facts bringing the plaintiff within the terms of the Civil Rights Act there involved. We think the same power is available to a trial court in an action brought under Section 1985, even though that section refers in precise terms only to a suit for damages. As the court said [in Jones'], ‘The fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement does not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an effective equitable remedy . . .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(1) the defendant must conspire or go in disguise on the highway or premises of another; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) one or more of the conspirators must commit some act in furtherance of the conspiracy; whereby (4) another is either (a) injured in his person or property or (b) deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States [; and] (5) that the conspirators’ conduct must be unlawful independent of the section 1985(3) violation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.