McGraw v. Barnhart’s Empirical Analysis
450 F.3d 493 · 2006
Citation profile
26 federal appellate · 9 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently July 2024 · most notably United States v. Hinckley (2008), United States v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield Of Utah (2006)
26 federal appellate · 9 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Skidmore v. Swift & Co. · Aetna Life Ins Co of Hartford Conn v. Haworth · United States v. Mead Corp. · Christensen v. Harris County
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[S]ection 406(b)(1) establishes a separate standard for awarding fees for work performed in cases decided by a judge and that those fees may not be “in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits.” Thus, for services performed before the [Commissioner], the [Commissioner] is free to set a reasonable fee, except as otherwise provided in the statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 406 (a)(2)(A). For services performed in a federal court where the court awards benefits, the attorney fee award is limited to 25 percent of past-due benefits. Finally, in cases where the court remands the case back to the [Commissioner] for further proceedings, the court will set the fee-limited to 25 percent of past-due benefits-for the work performed before it, and the [Commissioner] will award whatever fee the [Commissioner] deems reasonable for the work performed on remand and pri- or administrative proceedings.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wrenn v. Astrue · Pais v. Kijakazi“When interpreting the language of a statute, the starting point is always the language of the statute itself. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute controls. A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[a] motion for an award of fees under § 406(b)(1) should be filed within a reasonable time of the Commissioner's decision awarding benefits.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.