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← 450 MICH 1 - Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc.

Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

79
cited by 79 later decisions
8
states following
July 2017
most recently cited

14 federal appellate · 2 district · 15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 79 later decisions — most recently July 2017 · most notably Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co. (1997), Couch v. Astec Industries, Inc. (2002)

14 federal appellate · 2 district · 15 state decisions

300199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914)

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A conscious decision to design a product in a certain manner necessitates that the focus be on conduct rather than the product. Hence, the trier of fact must employ a risk-utility balancing test that considers alternative safer designs and the accompanying risk pared against the risk and utility of the design chosen “to determine whether ... the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in making the design choices it made.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “At issue in this case is the propriety of a continuing duty to repair or recall theory of products liability in a negligent design case. The inquiry is whether Michigan law recognizes a continuing duty to repair or recall.... We hold that there is no continuing duty to repair or recall ... a product. [[Image here]] In Michigan, there are two theories that will support a finding of negligent design. The first theory is based on a failure to warn. This theory renders the product defective even if the design chosen does not render the product defective. This warning includes the duty to warn about dangers regarding the intended uses of the product, as well as foreseeable misuses. If, however, the manufacturer is not aware of the defect until after manufacture or sale, it has a duty to warn upon learning of the defect; if there exists a point-of-manu-faeture duty to warn, a postmanufacture duty to warn necessarily continues upon learning of the defect. The other, more traditional means of proving negligent design questions whether the design chosen renders the product defective, i.e., whether a risk-utility analysis favored an available safer alternative. In such a complaint, the focus of any duty begins with whether the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s control. [[Image here]] Because a prima facie case is established once the risk-utility test is proven, we are persuaded that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or introduce an additional duty to retrofit ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[C]ourts that impose a post-sale obligation to remedy or replace products already in the marketplace arrogate to themselves a power equivalent to that of requiring product recall. Product recalls, however, are properly the province of administrative agencies, as the federal statutes that expressly delegate recall authority to various agencies suggest. As Congress has recognized, ad ministrative agencies have the institutional resources to make fully informed assessments of the marginal benefits of recalling a specific product. Because the cost of locating, recalling, and replacing mass-marketed products can be enormous and will likely be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, the recall power should not be exercised without extensive consideration of its economic impact. Courts, however, are constituted to define individual cases, and their inquiries are confined to the particular facts and arguments in the cases before them. Decisions to expand a manufacturer’s post-sale duty beyond making reasonable efforts to warn product users about newly discovered dangers should be left to administrative agencies, which are better able to weigh the costs and benefits of such action. [Schwartz, The post-sale duty to warn: Two unfortunate forks in the road to a reasonable doctrine, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 892, 901.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.