Purvis v. Crosby’s Empirical Analysis
451 F.3d 734 · 2006
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 15 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 45 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2022 · most notably Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017), 961 So. 2d 312 - Carratelli v. State (2007)
12 federal appellate · 15 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brecht v. Abrahamson · Cuyler v. Sullivan · Arizona v. Fulminante · Johnson v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“the “unusual case” involving the “peculiar circumstances” where counsel recognized and pressed an issue before the trial court and then neglected to take some step that is relevant only to the appellate stage. This is the more typical ineffective assistance of trial counsel case where the claim is that trial counsel did not raise the issue at all. The broad, generally applicable rule of measuring prejudice in terms of impact on the result of the trial instead of on the result of the appeal, which is set out in Strickland ... applies; the razor thin exception recognized in the Davis case does not.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Any defendant who could not make the prejudice showing necessary to have a defaulted claim of structural [trial court] error considered could bypass that requirement by merely dressing that claim in ineffective assistance garb and asserting that prejudice must be presumed.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[a]s the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[t]he principle that collateral review is different from direct review resounds throughout our habeas jurisprudence,” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633 , 113 S.Ct. at 1719 . To hold that the presumption of prejudice applies not only when properly preserved structural errors are raised on appeal but also when related ineffective assistance claims are raised in a collateral proceeding would dimmish the difference between direct and collateral review. It would undermine the important finality arjd comity interests that are entitled to respect in a § 2254 proceeding, like this one. That we decline to do.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.