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← 451 F.3d 946 - Brown v. Lambert

Brown v. Lambert’s Empirical Analysis

451 F.3d 946 · 2005

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
March 2014
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Williams v. Taylor · Witherspoon v. Illinois · Wainwright v. Witt · Lindh v. Murphy · Bumper v. North Carolina

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[I]f you found Mr. Brown guilty of the crime of first degree murder with one or more aggravating circumstances, then you would be reconvened for a second phase called a sentencing phase. During that sentencing phase proceeding you could hear additional evidence [and] arguments concerning the penalty to be imposed. You would then be asked to retire to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed or whether the punishment should be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. “In making this determination you would be asked the following question: Having in mind the crime with which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? . If you unanimously answered yes to this question, the sentence would be death.... [Otherwise] the sentence would be life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole.” Id., at 1089-1090.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““[Brown] did not object at trial to the State’s challenge of [Juror Z] for cause. At any rate, [Juror Z] was properly excused. On voir dire he indicated he would impose the death penalty where the defendant ‘would reviolate if released,’ which is not a correct statement of the law. He also misunderstood the State’s burden of proof ... although he was corrected later. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing [Juror Z] for cause.” Id., at 604 , 940 P. 2d, at 585 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “If all prospective jurors who did not fully understand the law before the trial began were struck, only lawyers would be allowed to serve on jurys (and only a handful of lawyers at that”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.