(a) A person commits the crime of forgery in the second degree if, with intent to defraud, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed:

"(1) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment or a check, draft, note or other commercial instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status. . . ."

Section 13A-9-6 provides that:

"(a) A person commits the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree if he possesses or utters any forged instrument of a kind specified in Section 13A-9-3 with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud. . . ."

I Appellant contends that the court, as part of its oral charge, should have charged on the lesser offense of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree, referring to "a written instrument." All the evidence in this case indicates that the instrument whose possession was charged was a check. Even if the court had been called on to rule on this *Page 435 issue, which it was not, no error would have been committed by not charging on third degree criminal possession of a forged instrument.

II Minor asserts that the checks and the driver's license were improperly admitted into evidence as not authenticated. This contention is not supported by the record.

III Appellant next contends that the state failed to prove that the checks in question were forged. The testimony of the owners recited above was sufficient with the checks themselves to prove that the checks had been forged.

IV With regard to her sentencing, Minor contends that in the application of the Habitual Felony Offenders Act two convictions occurring in the same court at the same time should be considered one conviction. This issue was considered inWatson v. State, 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), and decided adversely to the position of appellant. The trial court correctly sentenced her under the Habitual Felony Offenders Act.

V Appellant contends that the Habitual Felony Offenders Act as applied to her is unconstitutional on the grounds that it is violative of the principles enunciated in Solem, v. Helm, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, (1983). Our Habitual Felony Offenders Act, § 13A-5-9, Code of Alabama 1975, has withstood attack on constitutional grounds in numerous cases. The appellant in this case was not sentenced to life without parole. The minimum sentence she could receive was 15 years. She was sentenced to 18 years for her fourth felony conviction. We are convinced that this sentence violates neither the letter nor the spirit of Solem v. Helm, supra.

This case is due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

All the Judges concur.

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