¶1ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶2In his amended motion for rehearing appellant, for the first time, asserts as ground for reversal that the indictment rendered against him, upon which he was convicted, is - fundamentally defective in that nowhere therein is there a description of the property taken other than “corporeal personal property.”
¶3While the rule as to sufficiency of an indictment to advise the accused with reasonable certainty of the accusation he is called upon to meet at the trial is not applied in later decisions of this court as strictly as it once was, the common law rule that robbery is but an aggravated form of theft, and that in charging the offense or robbery, as in charging larceny or theft, a description of the property taken is essential has been uniformly applied. Wilson v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 391, 356 S.W. 2d 928; Holland v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 384, 10 S.W.2d 561, and cases cited.
¶4The indictment which is found in the record on appeal contains no description of the corporeal personal property alleged to have been taken in the robbery.
¶5Wilson v. State, supra, is directly in point and supports appellant’s contention that the indictment herein is fundamentally defective and the conviction thereon cannot stand.
¶6Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, the affirmance is set aside, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.