Ernst v. Stone’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Where ... a petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, Congress has specified that a reviewing court shall not grant relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ... (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).... We employ a standard of “objective reasonableness” when reviewing a state court’s interpretation of federal law, which includes our evaluation of whether a state court unreasonably refused to extend a governing legal principle to a new context where it should apply. See Kennaugh v. Miller, 289 F.3d 36 , 45-46 n. 2 (2d Cir.2002). Mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance that “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law,” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 , we have held that “[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required” before habeas relief will be permitted, see, e.g., Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000). At the same time, however, we cautioned that “the increment need not be great” because “otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions ‘so far off the ma”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 436 F. Supp. 2d 474 - Monroe v. Kuhlman

2. “the New York Supreme Court orders a psychiatric examination “to determine the defendant’s current mental condition and then holds a hearing as to the appropriate disposition” ... Based on its findings at this hearing, the New York Supreme Court must then place the defendant in one of three categories, or “tracks.” If the defendant is determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, to suffer from a “dangerous mental disorder,” as that term is defined under New York law, he must be committed to a secure psychiatric facility. Defendants in this position are colloquially referred to as “track one” defendants. If the NRRMDD defendant is determined not to be suffering from a “dangerous mental disorder,” but nonetheless to be “mentally ill,” as that term is defined under New York law, he is remanded to the custody of the State Commissioner of Mental Health (the “Commissioner”) subject to an “order of conditions” authorized by the CPL, but his commitment is then governed by the civil commitment provisions of New York Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) ... These NRRMDD defendants, who, in the court’s view, require inpatient treatment for their mental illness but who do not suffer from a “dangerous mental disorder,” are referred to as “track two” defendants. Finally, NRRMDD defendants who are adjudged by the court to be neither “mentally ill” nor suffering from a “dangerous mental disorder” are referred to as “track three” defendants. Such defendants must be either discharged unconditionally o”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 628 F. Supp. 2d 286 - Richard S. v. Carpinello