Dicenzi v. Rose’s Empirical Analysis
452 F.3d 465 · 2006
Citation profile
11 federal appellate · 2 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably Apanovitch v. Houk (2006), Ford v. Gonzalez (2012)
11 federal appellate · 2 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Lott v. Coyle · Aron v. United States · Wims v. United States · Searcy v. Carter · Abela v. Martin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. (2) The time during which a properly-filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[t]he proper task ... is to determine when a duly diligent person in petitioner’s circumstances would have discovered [his right to an appeal]. After that date, petitioner was entitled to further delay (whether in actually making the discovery, or in acting on a previously made discovery, or for any other reason whatsoever), so long as he filed his petition within one year of the date in which the discovery would have been made in the exercise of due diligence.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“DiCenzi first claims that the [Ohio] appellate court improperly refused to allow him to file a delayed appeal.... [T]he Ohio Supreme Court granted DiCenzi’s motion for leave to file the appeal [of the Ohio appellate court’s refusal], and ordered the parties to brief the jurisdictional merits of the appeal. On April 3, 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that DiCenzi’s claim did not merit Ohio Supreme Court jurisdiction because no significant constitutional question was presented.... The statute of limitations was thus tolled until the April 3, 2002 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. Further, that court’s decision not to hear DiCenzi’s appeal, like all decisions of a state’s highest court, could have been appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Following the April 3, 2002 decision, DiCenzi thus had an additional ninety days’ worth of tolling in order to petition for certiorari, whether or not he actually did so.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Bachman v. Bagley
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.