Grennier v. Frank’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Defendants allow that Wisconsin has become less willing to release persons convicted of serious offenses and now demands assurance that interests in deterrence, desert, and public safety have been satisfied before a murderer will be let free. Neither the ex post facto clause nor the due process clause has anything to say about how discretion will be exercised under an open-ended system, however. [Citation.] Grennier has no more entitlement to a liberal release policy than he would have had to be sentenced by a judge who favored home confinement over prison. The constitutional interest is in the rules and statutes — the ‘laws’ to which it refers — rather than the attitudes of public officials who administer a discretionary system.” Grennier, 453 F.3d at 445 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Shaw v. Frank · 241 Ill. 2d 479 - Hill v. Walker

2. “Doubtless these four decisions contain some language to that effect. But they do not so hold, because in each the sex offender designation was pertinent to a decision that the court believed to entail a protected interest (such as an opportunity for parole under a non-discretionary system — say, one providing that “every well-behaved prisoner except a sex offender is entitled to parole after serving 20 years”). It was the liberty or property interest stemming from statutes and regulations, and not the “sex offender” label alone, that required the hearing. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 , 96 S.Ct. 1155 , 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), holds that the shame and humiliation of being called a criminal is not enough by itself to require a hearing under the due process clause.... [Ojnly when the state goes further and makes a concrete decision that affects liberty or property ... is a hearing essential.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 636 F. Supp. 2d 496 - Gilmore v. Bostic

3. “liberty or property interest in the prospect of parole under Wisconsin's discretionary system”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole