Wulp v. Corcoran’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

40 federal appellate · 18 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * it ean no longer be seriously contended that the mere fact that newspapers such as those which plaintiffs wish to distribute are offered for sale rather than distributed free of charge dilutes the protection otherwise afforded by the First Amendment. Whatever room for doubt there may once have been on this score was removed by Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 , 80 S.Ct. 215 , 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959). The Court in that case stated with respect to the First Amendment rights of a bookseller charged with violation of a state obscenity statute that ‘[i]t is of course no matter that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices.’ Id. at 150 , 80 S.Ct. at 217 . In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Court reaffirmed its allegiance to this view by giving full First Amendment protection to a newspaper which had accepted a paid advertisement alleged to be libelous. Cf. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , 63 S.Ct. 862 , 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., [ 297 U.S. 233 , 56 S.Ct. 444 , 880 L.Ed. 660 (1936)]. See also Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv.L.R. 1191 (1965).” Wulp v. Corcoran, supra, 454 F.2d at 835, n. 13 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 211 N.J. Super. 121 - News Printing Co. v. TOTOWA BOR. · 381 F. Supp. 228 - Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough Council of Public Works

2. ““There is a clear and significant difference in the appropriateness of federal relief between pending and preprosecution contexts. The policies militating against intervention, canvassed in Younger v. Harris, do not apply to all or apply with greatly diminished strength in the latter context. The traditional restraint of equity, calculated to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings is not here present. And considerations of comity do not push nearly so strongly where there is no ongoing state proceeding to be aborted. Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1/11/72).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Poe v. Menghini · Sandra Lee Becker, Etc., Richard Guy Steffel v. John R. Thompson, Etc.

3. “While Mr. Justice Brennan's views in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 93, 91 S.Ct. 674 et seq., did not prevail in view of the majority's recognition of a prior pending state prosecution, 401 U.S. at 86, n.2, 91 S.Ct. 674, we cannot dismiss the Congressional history reviewed by him, 401 U.S. at 112-115, 91 S.Ct. 674, expressly contemplating resort to the milder, less intrusive, and more timely remedy of a declaratory judgment to test criminal laws, both state and federal. See e. g., Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 , 1347-1348 (3d Cir. 1971); Anderson v. Vaughn, 327 F.Supp. 101, 102 (D. Conn.1971) (three-judge court). Were the law to be that a plaintiff could not obtain a declaratory judgment that a local ordinance was unconstitutional when no state prosecution is pending unless he could allege and prove circumstances justifying a federal injunction of an existing state prosecution, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act would have been pro tanto repealed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sandra Lee Becker, Etc., Richard Guy Steffel v. John R. Thompson, Etc.