United States v. Griffith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), which immediately precedes § 922(g)(9), is part of a provision restricting firearm possession by anyone subject to a court order that prohibits the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force ... that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(8)(C)(ii). The significance of the limiting language narrowing the scope of that provision to force “that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury” is that Congress put the limitation into the last subsection that precedes § 922(g)(9), but not into § 922(g)(9) itself or into the definition of “crime of domestic violence” that is contained in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). “It is well settled that where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 , 173, 121 S.Ct. 2120 , 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (internal citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). If Congress had wanted to limit the physical force requirement in § 922(g)(9), it could have done so, as it did in the last clause of the preceding paragraph of the same subsection, see § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), and with the same limiting language or something similar to it, but that is not what Congress did.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. White

2. “Although not an immigration case, Griffith is relevant here because a “crime of domestic violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(9) is defined to include an offense, ... that “... has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force.” ... This is essentially the same definition of a “crime of violence” as in 18 U.S.C. § 16 (a)[.] In Griffith , this Court discussed whether physical contact necessarily involves physical force and held that “[a] person cannot make physical contact—particularly of an insulting or provoking na ture—with another without exerting some level of physical force.” ... In so holding, the Griffith Court expressly declined to insert the requirement of “violent” force before the words ‘physical force’ in the statutory definition of ‘crime of violence’ and concluded that the simple physical contact made illegal by § 16-5-23(a)(l) satisfied the ‘use of physical force’ definition of a “crime of violence” in § 921(a)(33)(A).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Eron Yanes-Cruz

3. “The traditional doctrine of noscitur a sociis, that “the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to associated words and phrases,” guides us in our inquiry. In the federal definition, the associated phrase is “threatened use of a deadly weapon.” That is a gravely serious threat to apply to physical force. By contrast, the Wyoming statute criminalizes conduct that is minimally forcible, though ungentlemanly.... It may well be Wyoming’s purpose to enable police to arrest people in such confrontations in order to avoid the risk that rude touchings will escalate into violence.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Hays