Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 169 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Pretext may be shown ‘either directly by persuading the [trier of fact] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’ ” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ). Under the “honest belief’ rule developed by the Seventh Circuit, “so long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason,” an employee cannot prove pretext even if the employer’s reason in the end is shown to be “mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir.1998). We have rejected the Seventh Circuit’s bare “honest belief’ doctrine and instead have adopted a modified honest-belief approach. Id. (holding that “[t]o the extent the Seventh Circuit’s application of the ‘honest belief rule credits an employer’s belief without requiring that it be reasonably based on particularized facts rather than on ignorance and mythology, we reject its approach”). Under this approach, for an employer to avoid a finding that its claimed nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual, “the employer must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.” Id. at 806-07 (defining standard in the context of an Americans with Disabilities Act claim); see also Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 614 (6th C”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Clay v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · Hickle v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.

2. “that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case. Once a prima facie case has been shown, the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that the defendant discriminated against him or her in violation of Title VII. The defendant then bears the burden of production to put forth a legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for the complained of adverse treatment. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case falls away and the plaintiff then needs to show that the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination. Throughout this burden-shifting approach, the plaintiff continues to bear the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the intent to discriminate.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sybrandt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. · Gibson v. Shelly Co.

3. “Grandview has produced evidence that Miller reasonably relied upon the investigation of the incident when he terminated Stewart’s employment. The investigation revealed that Stewart used excessive force on the patient. Further, Stewart has not identified sufficient evidence to establish that Grandview failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision. Therefore, there are no genuine issues of material fact and Grandview’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Stewart’s employment is not a pretext for discrimination.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Till v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services · 576 F. App'x 518 - Doug Stewart v. Kettering Health Network