Moats v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Before concluding this opinion, we offer a few thoughts for judges—whether they be tasked with considering a warrant application or reviewing the decision of the judge who issued the warrant—that they might want to consider when the search at issue involves a cell phone. Unlike those of us who review search warrants for substantial basis or good faith execution, the judges of our circuit courts and the District Court to whom warrant applications are presented have the more challenging task of determining whether probable cause exists in the first instance. In examining an affidavit in support of a warrant to search a cell phone, as in any other warrant application, judges always must consider the totality of the information contained in the affidavit. Not every affidavit will (or should) result in issuance of a warrant to search a cell phone. We can imagine situations in which the nature of the crime will not support a warrant to search the suspect’s cell phone; examples might include traffic offenses, public nuisance crimes, and the like. Even in cases where the connection between the suspected crime and the cell phone is more likely to be established, the lack of factual detail or other circumstances might countenance against a finding of probable cause. The affiant’s professed training and experience might fall short of demonstrating to the judge’s satisfaction that the affiant’s prediction can be relied upon in determining whether the evidence sought will be found in the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stevenson v. State

2. “[Djirect evidence has never been required by the Fourth Amendment. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 [ 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 ] (1996) (“[0]ur cases have recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.”); Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506, 522 [ 796 A.2d 90 ] (2002) (“Direct evidence that contraband exists in the home is not required for a search warrant; rather, probable cause may be inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the opportunity for concealment, and reasonable inferences about where the defendant may hide the incriminating items.”); State v. Ward, 350 Md. 372, 379 [ 712 A.2d 534 ] (1998) (concluding that the suspect’s home was a “probable place for secreting objects” related to the crime) (quoting Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 280 [ 363 A.2d 491 ] (1976)). There must, of course, be a reasonable basis for such an inference to be drawn. See Holmes, 368 Md. at 523 [ 796 A.2d 90 ]; see also Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 87 [ 998 A.2d 868 ] (2010).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stevenson v. State

3. ““a ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 [ 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 ] (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 [ 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 ] (1983)). Thus, “ ‘the quanta ... of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the [probable-cause] decision,” Id. at 371 [ 124 S.Ct. 795 ] (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 [ 103 S.Ct. 2317 ]).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stevenson v. State