455 Pa. Super. 89 - Commonwealth v. Layhue’s Empirical Analysis
1996
Citation profile
23 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently July 2011
23 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 302 Pa. Super. 145 - Commonwealth v. Galloway · 317 Pa. Super. 362 - Commonwealth v. Mathis · 419 Pa. Super. 582 - In Re Benson · 436 Pa. Super. 509 - Matos v. Rivera
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(c) Mandatory restitution.— (1) The court shall order full restitution: (i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Crime Victim’s Compensation Board or other governmental agency but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss previously compensated by the board to the Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund or other designated account when the claim involves a government agency in addition to or in place of the board. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from an insurance company but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss previously compensated by an insurance company to the insurance company.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“There are, of course, cases of fraudulent claims or other criminal misconduct in dealing with an insurer where the only victim is an insurance company. Surely in such case, Galloway did not intend to prohibit an order of restitution. Rather, we interpret the Galloway majority as prohibiting an order of restitution where the insurer’s loss is merely consequential to the criminal conduct. In Galloway , the arson was part of a course of conduct intended to harm defendant’s wife. Similarly, [Com. v.] Mathis[, 317 Pa.Super, 464 A.2d 362 (Pa.Super. 1983)] is an assault case, where the insurer’s liability for medical expenses is consequential to the treatment for injuries sustained in the assault upon the intended victims. Thus, in neither case was there evidence which would support an intention to extract payments from an insurer. As the colloquy in this case demonstrates, appellant was charged with (and plead nolo contendere to) an arson or explosion to a car in order to collect insurance. This places the insurance company in the posture of being the intended victim of the crime and we conclude that the restitution order is neither illegal nor impermissible under the controlling cases and statutes....”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Cross“(c) Mandatory restitution.—In addition to the alternatives set forth in subsection (a) of this section [one of which is intermediate punishment] the court shall order the defendant to compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained. For purposes of this subsection, the term Victim’ shall be as defined in section 479.1 of the act of April 9, 1929 (P.L. 177, No. 175), known as The Administrative Code of 1929.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.