Commonwealth v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The remedy of exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of art. 14 is one of recent rather than ancient origin. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 364 (1985). One of the purposes justifying its application is the deterrence of police conduct that unlawfully intrudes on the rights of privacy and security guaranteed our citizens under art. 14, through the preclusion of the fruits of that conduct. Another is the protection of judicial integrity through the dissociation of the courts from unlawful conduct. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 394 Mass. 421, 433 (1985) (Lynch, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141, 145 (1984) (discussing purposes of exclusionary rule under Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution). Where those purposes are not furthered, rigid adherence to a rule of exclusion can only frustrate the public interest in the admission of evidence of criminal activity.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 32 Mass. L. Rptr. 450 - Commonwealth v. Polanco · 32 Mass. L. Rptr. 453 - Commonwealth v. Jeffreys

2. “dispense” in the state statute is defined and limited to "deliver[y]” to the "ultimate user,” and “ultimate user” is defined as someone who "lawfully possesses a controlled substance for his own use or the use of a member of his household.” Id. at 855 (emphasis removed) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 1). So according to Brown, a drug is not "dispensed” under that statute if a person receives it because of “an invalid prescription”—though in that situation, because she “has devolved into a ‘pusher,’ ” the physician can be prosecuted for “the crime of ‘distribution.’ ” Id. at 857-58 . Importantly for us, the FFDCA provisions in play here have no lawful-possession requirement. And given this big-time difference between the two statutes, there is no need to rely on Brown. 6 . Interestingly, the defendants later admit that they did do more than check addresses, conceding in a footnote that NECC "use[d] a pharmacist ... to check that the name and dosage of the drug on the shipping label [was] the same as the name and dosage on the order form.” No big deal, they say, because NECC's use of a pharmacist was "a surfeit” and “hardly means that a non-pharmacist could not easily have performed the task.” To their minds, "a pharmacist would only be required”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Stepanets

3. “the threshold element of unlawful dispensing is the issuance of an invalid prescription - 17 - . . . i.e., one issued without a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of the physician's professional practice.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Pitt