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← 456 NE2D 420 - Ross v. State

Ross v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1983

Citation profile

62
cited by 62 later decisions
4
states following
March 2019
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 57 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 62 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Tumulty v. State (1996), United States v. Kane (1991)

2 federal appellate · 57 state decisions

2701983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on North Carolina v. Alford · Lynch v. Overholser · Harshman v. State · Abraham v. State · Batchelor v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We hold, as a matter of law, that a judge may not accept a plea of guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and maintains his innocence at the same time. To accept such a plea constitutes reversible error.”
    11 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[A] plea of guilty tendered by one who in the same breath protests his innocence, or declares he actually does not know whether or not he is guilty, is no plea at all. Certainly it is not a sufficient plea upon which to base a judgment of conviction. No plea of guilty should be accepted when it appears to be doubtful whether it is being intelligently and understandingly made, or when it appears that, for any reason, the plea is wholly inconsistent with the realities of the situation.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty. An individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime. Whether he [defendant] realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither [Defendant] nor his attorney desired. Confronted with the choice between a trial for first-degree murder, on the one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other, [Defendant] quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the maximum penalty to a 30-year term. In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and [Defendant’s] clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting [the plea agreement],”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.