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← 457 A.2d 674 - Weber v. State

Weber v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1983

Citation profile

65
cited by 65 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
13
states following
June 2016
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 60 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 65 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2016 · most notably Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), Moran v. Burbine (1986)

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 60 state decisions — followed in 13 states

2401983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · United States v. Agurs · Giglio v. United States · Davis v. Alaska

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[I]f prior to or during custodial interrogation, and unknown to the suspect, a specifically retained or properly designated lawyer is actually present at a police station seeking an opportunity to render legal advice or assistance to the suspect, and the police intentionally or negligently failed to inform the suspect of that fact, then any statement obtained after the police themselves know of the attorney's efforts to assist the suspect, or any evidence derived from any such statement, is not admissible on any theory that the suspect intelligently and knowingly waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel as established by Miranda.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “When the cross-examination relates to impeachment evidence, the test for determining if the trial judge’s limitation on cross-examination violated the defendant’s confrontation right is whether the jury had in its possession sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness. Chipman [v. Mer cer], 628 F.2d at [528] 530 [9th Cir.1980]. More specifically, we look to the cross-examination permitted to ascertain (1) if the jury was exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased. [United States v.] Summers, 598 F.2d [450] at 461 [5th Cir.1979].”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.