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457 F.2d 764

Docket No. 71-2759.

Drury v. Cox

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided March 7, 1972.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1972-03-07

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.”

quoted by 6 later decisions, including Dolack v. Allenbrand, Ortega v. Craig

Relies on Younger v. Harris · Drury v. Burr

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1972-03-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently August 2019 · most notably State v. Drury (1974), Rivers v. Lucas (1973)

14 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

12019721980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Howard A. Kashman, Pima County Public Defender, Tucson, Ariz., for petitioner-appellant.

¶2Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Rose Silver, Pima County Atty., John L. Augustine, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, Ariz., for respondent-appellee.

¶3Before CHAMBERS, KOELSCH and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM:

¶5The district court considered the issue in this case to be whether the evidence at a preliminary hearing before an Arizona State Magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause to bind Drury over for trial on an open charge of murder, degree unspecified. The Arizona Supreme Court held the evidence sufficient. Drury v. Burr, 107 Ariz. 124, 483 P.2d 539 (1971). The district court, after an independent review of the record, agreed and denied Drury’s petition for habeas corpus without a hearing. Drury appeals, claiming that his detention for trial amounted to a denial of due process because of lack of probable cause.

¶6We affirm on different grounds. Our reading of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, convinces us that only in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, *765judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts. Apparent finality of one issue is not enough.

¶7The order denying relief is affirmed.

¶8The mandate will issue now.

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