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457 F.2d 806

Docket No. 71-1697.

Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided March 22, 1972.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1972-03-22

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently July 1983

5 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Relies on Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1972-03-22

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¶1Wilfred O. Schmidt, Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendant-appellant;. Gordon J. Quist, Peter J. Kok, Grand Rapids, Mich., on brief.

¶2J. Warren Eardley, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee; Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones, Ronald J. Clark, Grand Rapids, Mich., on brief.

¶3Before McCREE and KENT, Circuit Judges, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the District Court, after a trial without a jury, awarding damages to the plaintiff-appellee and against the defendant-appellant for violation of Title 7, § 703(a) (1) Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2(a).(l).

¶6After a three-day trial the District Judge concluded that the appellee had established by competent evidence the existence of racially discriminatory practices with respect to appellee’s employment by the appellant. The appellant complains that the trial court relied upon erroneous statistics. The record shows that the statistical information used was taken from a document prepared by the appellant. The trial court was never advised as to any alleged error in the statistical information relied upon.

¶7We recognize that statistical information may be an acceptable method for determining the existence or absence of racially prejudicial employment practices, Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), but on this record we are not persuaded that the statistical information was the controlling evidence upon which the trial court relied in reaching its conclusion.

¶8Appellant also complains that the trial court should have credited the testimony of the witnesses for the appellant as opposed to the witnesses for the appellee. The determination of the credibility of witnesses is confided solely to the trier *807of the facts and should not be disturbed on appeal except in unusual circumstances.

¶9Upon examination of the entire record we cannot say that the findings of fact of the trial judge are “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

¶10The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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