¶2 Chad Singleton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal habeas peti *585 tion time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
¶3 We review the dismissal of a habeas petition de novo, Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir.2001), and the district court’s factual findings for clear error, Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir.2007). We view the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Singleton. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 201, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006).
¶4 Singleton’s federal habeas petition is untimely, as he filed it after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
¶5 Singleton concedes that statutory tolling does not apply.
¶6 Equitable tolling is available only where extraordinary circumstances ■ beyond the prisoner’s control made it impossible to file a petition on time. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). Singleton is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows that (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562-63, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).
¶7 Singleton did not act diligently. He has not explained the unreasonable gaps between the filing of each state petition, or from the finding of untimeliness by the state courts to the filing of his federal petition. See, e.g., Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir.2011).
¶8 Singleton also has not shown how his disabilities prevented him from filing a timely petition. He bears the burden of showing that he was incapable of filing his federal petition on time. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir.2002). He has not done so.
¶9 AFFIRMED.