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← 459 F.2d 200 - Almond v. Kent

Almond v. Kent’s Empirical Analysis

459 F.2d 200 · 1972

Citation profile

145
cited by 145 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
6
states following
November 2018
most recently cited

57 federal appellate · 7 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 145 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2018 · most notably Wilson v. Garcia (1985), Runyon v. McCrary (1976)

57 federal appellate · 7 district · 13 state decisions

78019721980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Monroe v. Pape · O'Sullivan v. Felix · Southern Railway Co. v. Jackson · Arizona v. California · Brazier v. Cherry

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 145 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In essence, § 1983 creates a cause of action where there has been injury, under color of state law, to the person or to the constitutional or federal statutory rights which emanate from or are guaranteed to the person. In the broad sense, every cause of action under § 1983 which is well-founded results from “personal injuries.””
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “.“We agree that, to the extent that Almond’s § 1983 complaint alleges a violation of his constitutional rights resulting in personal injuries of the type that would be actionable at common law, the Virginia two-year period unquestionably applies. But this is so, not because there was a right of recovery at common law but because there was a violation of a constitutional right not to be beaten. We think it follows that the Virginia two-year period applies to all other rights which may be redressed under § 1983 by the recovery of money damages. Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action, unknown at common law, ‘[for] the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws (of the United States) . . .’ This right of recovery depends upon federal considerations, and it is not one which is concerned with the archaic concepts of survivability of the common law . In the broad sense, every cause of action under § 1983 which is well-founded results from ‘personal injuries.’ ” (Emphasis supplied).”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Every personal action, for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within five years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for a matter of such nature that in case a party die it can be brought by or against his representative; and, if it be for a matter not of such nature, shall be brought within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.