Bates v. Township of Van Buren’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Bates’s case satisfies each of the components discussed in Adair . First, Bates and The Garter Belt had a substantial identity of interests because each sought a facial invalidation of the ordinance. It is of no moment that The Garter Belt was a defendant in the earlier action whereas Bates is a plaintiff here; Adair speaks of “interests,” and offers only as an example of parties with identical interests those who seek the same relief. Accordingly, Adair has often been invoked to bar later actions by parties who were previously defendants (or their privies) notwithstanding that they sought no relief in the earlier cases. See, e.g., Reed v. City of Detroit, 2005 WL 176665 , No. 247557, 2005 Mich.App. LEXIS 172 (Mich.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2005) (unpublished) (barring action by a subsequent owner i.e., a privy of the prior owner-against the city based upon earlier tax foreclosure action against the pri- or owner). Nor do Bates’s interests diverge from The Garter Belt’s because she seeks damages in addition to declaratory relief. The only basis she alleges for such damages is the ordinance’s facial unconstitutionality, so the substance of her complaint remains on all fours with The Garter Belt’s defense in the earlier action. Second, Bates and The Garter Belt, the only club where she danced, had no less a “working functional relationship” than did the parties considered in Adair . Third, Bates’s interests were presented and protected by The Garter Belt in the previous litigation. Had ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ludwig v. TOWNSHIP OF VAN BUREN

2. “we note that Bates has not challenged Michigan’s res judicata doctrine as unconstitutional under Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 , 116 S.Ct. 1761 , 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996). In Richards , the Court held that a state court’s “extreme” application of state res judicata principles to bar a “stranger” to a previous judgment from pursuing her constitutional claims deprived that party of Fourteenth Amendment due process. 517 U.S. at 797, 802 , 116 S.Ct. 1761 , 135 L.Ed.2d 76 . Richards did not concern a series of facial challenges, so it is quite possibly distinguishable from this case. Either way, the issue is not properly before the court, as Bates has not raised the argument.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ludwig v. TOWNSHIP OF VAN BUREN

3. “To be in privity is to be so identified in interest with another party that the first litigant represents the same legal right that the later litigant is trying to assert. The outer limit of the doctrine traditionally requires both [1] a ‘substantial identity of interests’ and [2] a ‘working functional. relationship’ in which [3] the interests of the nonparty are presented and protected by the party in the. litigation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ausable River Trading Post, LLC v. Dovetail Solutions, Inc.