Morse v. Swank, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[o]n the factual questions whether there was a combination or conspiracy and whether it had the intent or effect of restraining competition, Morse has so far provided meager support. The Court is mindful, however, of the Supreme Court’s caution concerning summary judgment in antitrust cases: “We believe that summa ry procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.” Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 , 82 S.Ct. 486, 491 , 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(foot-note omitted). The instant case cannot be thought of as complex antitrust litigation, but motive and intent are key questions, and the answers are in the hands of the alleged coconspirators. Accordingly, Morse should have the opportunity to pursue his claims through discovery, and the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the antitrust cause of action are denied with leave to renew after completion of discovery. Morse, by further discovery, including but not limited to depositions of Swank officials and Max Bellest, shall “set forth specific facts” as to the alleged combination or conspiracy among the defendants.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morse v. Swank, Inc.

2. “In his letter terminating negotiations with Morse, Duquesnoy referred to a long-standing relationship between Cardin and Swank that began at least as early as October 13,1967 when those two parties entered a licensing agreement for the manufacture and sale of men’s jewelry and related product lines. The term jewelry was understood to include lighters. The agreement gave Swank exclu sive rights to market the specified items except, as is relevant here, “to jewelry manufactured of precious metals or containing precious stones, retailing at a price in excess of $75.00 per item.” Cardin-Swank Agreement, dated October 13, 1967, ¶ 1, appended to Cardin Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“1967 Agreement”)[ 2 ] However, while Swank began exploring the marketing of Cardin lighters in 1975, see affidavit of John A. Tulin, sworn to April 1978, Exhibits A, B (letters from prospective suppliers of Cardin lighters providing requested prices) ., not until March 8, 1977 did Marshall Tulin, vice-president of Swank, write Pierre Cardin to tell him of Swank’s decision to consider the sale of lighters as provided for in the 1967 Agreement. Two weeks later, SARL, through Duquesnoy, terminated further negotiations with Morse.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morse v. Swank, Inc.

3. “Oreck Corp. . . . mandates resort to rule of reason, rather than per se, analysis in cases of vertical agreements to protect distributors from competition. In Oreck Corp., Whirlpool, a manufacturer of vacuums, and Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”), Whirlpool’s principal distributor, allegedly agreed that [Whirlpool’s] agreement with Oreck, another distributor, should be terminated. The court of appeals concluded that the vertical agreement, even with the purpose or effect of removing Sears’ competitor, could not alone amount to a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. To do so, the agreement must be “anticompetitive in purpose or effect,” a phrase the Second Circuit interprets to refer to its effect on the industry as a whole, not the effect on the excluded competitor alone. Id. at 133 . To have shown a violation, Oreck Corp. would have to have established that the alleged agreement to exclude it either promoted a Whirlpool monopoly in the vacuum cleaner industry or gave Sears a market position that enabled it to raise prices even with interbrand competition. Id. at 130 n. 5.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morse v. Swank, Inc.