459 So. 2d 53 - State v. Camp’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “at a stated address must reasonably be interpreted to permit a search of the dwelling house, the garage, and any other outbuildings within close proximity of the house proper that one normally associates with and includes within the word”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 794 So. 2d 56 - State v. Lincoln · 771 So. 2d 877 - State v. Raborn

2. “Art. 165. Authority of peace officer in executing a search warrant | gWhile in the course of executing a search warrant, a peace officer may make photographs, lift fingerprints, seize things whether or not described in the warrant that may constitute evidence tending to prove the commission of any offense, and perform all other acts pursuant to his duties. Article 165 thus authorizes the seizure of evidence or contraband located by the searching officers during the course of the search, even if that evidence or contraband is not listed in the warrant. It is axiomatic that such a seizure is described in search and seizure terms as being based on the “plain view” doctrine. The constitutional standards for that doctrine were formerly-enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). For the “plain view” doctrine to apply, Coolidge required a) a lawful initial intrusion, b) that incriminating evidence must be discovered inadvertently, and c) that it be “immediately apparent” that the item observed is evidence or contraband. Where the officers are searching on the authority of a warrant, as in this case, the authority of that warrant and the search for the items listed satisfies the first two requirements of the plain view doctrine. Thus the issue in this case, and in any other where the officers are acting on a warrant and evidence or contraband is seized which is not listed in the warrant, is whether the third or “immediately apparent”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 684 So. 2d 17 - State v. Davis

3. “[T]he "immediately apparent" requirement was substantially modified recently by the United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) when that court stated: Decisions by this court since Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately apparent" was verly likely an unhappy choice of words since it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for application of the "plain view" doctrine. Brown, supra, 103 S.Ct. 1542 . It is unclear what phrase or label might be used to replace that of "immediately apparent." However, the Brown court stated that "the rule from Payton, supra [ Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.d 639 (1980)], requiring probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, is consistent with the fourth amendment and we reafirm it here." Brown, supra, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1542. We may perhaps then change the label of the third requirement to that of "probable cause" to believe that the item is evidence or contraband. (Footnote omitted.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 471 So. 2d 949 - State v. Burns