459 So. 2d 948 - Ex Parte Daniel’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 527 So. 2d 1355 - Horsley v. State · 494 So. 2d 895 - Coulter v. State

2. “"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. "More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers simply to `counsel,' not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. See Michel v. Louisiana , 350 U.S. 91 , 100-101 , 76 S.Ct. 158 , 163-164 , 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955). The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 489 So. 2d 603 - Dunkins v. State · 565 So. 2d 1215 - Twyman v. State

3. “"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. CF. Engle v. Isaac , 456 U.S. 107 , 133-134 , 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 1574-1575 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered *Page 606 sound trial strategy.' See Michel v. Louisiana, supra , 350 U.S., at 101 , 76 S.Ct., at 164 . There are countless ways to provide effective assistance of any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 343 (1983).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 489 So. 2d 603 - Dunkins v. State