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← 46 F.2d 764 - Phillips v. Krakower

Phillips v. Krakower’s Empirical Analysis

46 F.2d 764 · 1931

Citation profile

90
cited by 90 later decisions
4
states following
February 2014
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 90 later decisions — most recently February 2014 · most notably In Re Ford (1980), Sumy v. Schlossberg (1985)

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 8 state decisions

370193119401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Lockwood v. Exchange Bank · Ades v. Caplin · Jordan v. Reynolds · Marburg v. Cole · Frey v. McGaw

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 90 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"And so, although the bankruptcy proceeding has brought no interest in the estate by the entireties into court for the benefit of the creditors of Phillips, his discharge in bankruptcy will remove that entire property beyond the reach of creditors entitled to subject it to their claims. The question presented is whether, without giving these creditors an opportunity to proceed, the court should grant the discharge knowing that it will result in legal fraud i. e. the effective withholding of the property from the reach of those entitled to subject it to their claims, for the beneficial ownership and possession of those who created the claims against it. We cannot conceive that any court would lend its aid to the accomplishment of a result so shocking to the conscience. "The purpose of the bankruptcy act was to equitably distribute the assets of distressed debtors among their creditors and to discharge them from further liability after this had been done. It was never contemplated that it should be used to perpetrate fraud or to shield assets from creditors. It is elementary that a bankrupt is not entitled to a discharge unless and until he surrendered his assets for the benefit of creditors; and he certainly is not in position to ask a court of bankruptcy, which is a court of equity, to grant him a discharge under the statute, when the effect of the discharge will be to withdraw from the reach of creditors property properly applicable to the satisfaction of their claims. Appel”
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““It was property, therefore, which was reachable by the creditor in the state courts, but, as here, the right of the creditor to subject it to his claim would be lost if the bankrupt were granted a discharge and his debt thereby extinguished.” “There is no difference in principle between that case (Lockwood) and the case at bar. In both there was property which did not pass to the trustee, but was reachable by the creditor under the laws of the state. In both a discharge of the bankrupt would have precluded a proceeding to subject the property to the satisfaction of the debt. And in both a stay of discharge was asked in order that .the property might be subjected to the claims of the creditor.” “ . . . The basis upon which relief is granted in either case, however, is not that the bankrupt has consented that property be subjected to the claims of the creditor, but that an equity exists in favor of the creditor because he is entitled to subject property to the satisfaction of his claim and this right will be extinguished by the granting of the discharge.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““ . . . may be protected by the court of bankruptcy, since, certainly, there would exist in favor of a creditor holding a waiver note, like that possessed by the petitioning creditor in the case at bar, an equity entitling him to a reasonable postponement of the discharge of the bankrupt in order to allow the institution in the state court of such proceedings as might be necessary to make effective the rights possessed by the creditor.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.