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← 46 F.3d 347 - Ostrander v. Green

Ostrander v. Green’s Empirical Analysis

46 F.3d 347 · 1995

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
11
states following
June 2021
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently June 2021 · most notably 25 Cal. 4th 230 - In Re Resendiz (2001), O'Dell III v. Jd Netherland J S III O'Dell III (1996)

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 15 state decisions — followed in 11 states

1801995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · North Carolina v. Alford · Hill v. Lockhart · Townsend v. Sain · Teague v. Lane

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A “rule” is a principle of law we apply to factual situations — be they few or many — within the rule’s intended meaning. Though cases are the hardware out of which we fashion rules, rules are more than just cases. Sometimes courts fashion broad rules intended to govern an array of factual settings; often they frame more narrowly. When we ask whether a proferred holding would be a “new rule,” we must therefore bear in mind the level of generality at which the prevailing rule or rules are meant to be applied. Turner, 35 F.3d at 883. Just as habeas petitioners could always avoid the Teague bar if we define “rules” at an abstractly broad level of generality (e.g. “due process”), so also could respondents erect, the bar in almost every case if we characterize a “rule” as “the most specific conclusion or holding [the petitioner] hopes we reachf.]” Id. (emphasis in original deleted). History does repeat itself, but not frequently or comprehensively enough to provide a case law exemplar for every set of facts.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We think that this misadvice falls well below the range of competence we must expect from defense lawyers.... There is a difference between a bad prediction within an accurate description of the law and gross misinformation about the law itself. If the lawyer simply underestimates the sentence, there may not be ineffective assistance.... We cannot expect criminal defense lawyers to be seers, but we must demand that they at least apprise themselves of the applicable law and provide their clients with a reasonably accurate description of it.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “where the client asks for advice about a “collateral consequence” and relies upon it in deciding whether to plead guilty, the attorney must not grossly misinform his client about the law. Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979). . . . We cannot expect criminal defense lawyers to be seers, but we must demand that they at least apprise themselves of the applicable law and provide their clients with a reasonably accurate description of it.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.