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46 F.3d 785

Docket No. 94-2828.

Hudson v. Gammon

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted Jan. 9, 1995.

Decided Jan. 30, 1995.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1995-01-30

2 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 636

Relies on Belk v. Purkett

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Morris Sheppard Arnold · Decided 1995-01-30

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently December 2017 · most notably United States v. Lothridge (2003), 917 F. Supp. 1356 - Cooperative Finance Ass'n, Inc. v. Garst (1996)

7 federal appellate · 1 district ·

320199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jane C. Hogan, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant.

¶2Michael J. Spillane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued, for appellee.

¶3Before LOKEN, Circuit Judge, GODBOLD,* Senior Circuit Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

¶5MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

¶6Missouri inmate John Hudson appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We reverse and remand.

¶7*786Following a jury trial, Hudson was convicted of four counts of first degree robbery. He filed this pro se habeas petition alleging various constitutional violations, including the denial of effective assistance of counsel and the denial of an impartial jury. After reviewing transcripts of the state court proceedings in which these issues were raised and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended denying relief. The district court overruled Hudson’s objections, noting its belief that they were not specific enough to invoke de novo review, and denied the petition pursuant to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. We do not reach the merits of the district court’s decision because we believe there was procedural error.

¶8A district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of a magistrate’s report and recommendation to which objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Here, the district court relied on the exception recognized in some circuits that de novo review is not required “when a party makes general and conelusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). Although “[tjhere is language in an Eighth Circuit case which indicates this Circuit’s approval of such an exception ... [t]he Eighth Circuit has ... repeatedly emphasized the necessity of de novo review, and thus retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate.” Id.(citations omitted).

¶9Liberally construed, Hudson’s pro se objections sufficiently directed the district court to the alleged errors. He attempted to bring his specific objections to the court’s attention by reciting the portions of the report and recommendation to which he objected and setting forth, with supporting transcript citations, what he believed to be the correct facts or rulings. While “not as ideally precise as a pleading from a trained lawyer, [Hudson’s] objections were certainly definite enough to require de novo review.” Id.

¶10The failure to perform de novo review when required is reversible error. See id.The State argues, however, that a remand for that purpose would be useless. It reasons that Hudson’s claims required no independent fact finding as the district court was required to defer to the findings made in the state court proceedings on these issues. Although accorded deference, state court factual findings are subject to review by habeas courts to determine if they are “fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). A remand is thus required to allow the district court to make a de novo assessment, independent of the magistrate judge’s conclusions, of whether these findings were so supported.

¶11Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand this case so the district court may conduct the required de novo review.

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