Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

46 F. App'x 501

McLaughlin v. Rendon

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Decided September 17, 2002

U.S. Courts of Appeals · decided 2002-09-17

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty · Castillo v. G · Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California

Decided 2002-09-17

¶1MEMORANDUM

¶2Sonja Indreland McLaughlin appeals pro se the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that a state court judge and his court administrator violated her constitutional rights, and her pendant state-law negligence claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

¶3The district court properly granted summary judgment for Superior Court Judge Borst on the ground of absolute judicial immunity because presiding over McLaughlin’s trial was clearly a judicial act. See Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 910 F.2d 561, 565-66 (9th Cir.1990). County Superior Court Administrator Rendon is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the act of setting McLaughlin’s trial dates was an integral part of the judicial process. Cf. Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 951-53 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the scheduling and noticing of hearings by a bankruptcy trustee is a discretionary function protected by absolute immunity).

¶4We affirm summary judgment on McLaughlin’s negligence claim against Ok*502anogan County for the reasons set forth in the district court’s October 4, 2001 order.

¶5AFFIRMED.

¶6 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

/46/fappx/501 · .json · Public domain