46 Md. App. 472 - McLee v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““He argues, however, that because he is still serving a term of confinement in a correctional institution for his prior convictions, he has not ‘served at least one term of confinement’ and thus is not eligible for the mandatory increased sentence. While we recognize a certain surface logic to this argument, we reject it. At the time appellant was convicted in 1979 of his third crime of violence he had served ‘at least one term of confinement’ for the 1970 offenses for which he was on parole, which would have been the entire prison term had he not violated his parole. In such a situation we do not interpret the statute so as to immunize third offenders from its effects. Cf. Leuschner v. State, 45 Md.App. 323, 354-355 [ 413 A.2d 227 ] (1980). To do so ‘would be to place a premium on the violation of a parole, a result entirely foreign to the purpose of the act.’ See People v. Martin [ 78 Cal.App.2d 340 ] 177 P.2d 813, 815 (1947), where the statute involved provided that every person convicted of certain specified felonies ‘who shall have been previously twice convicted [of certain felonies] upon charges separately brought and tried, and who shall have served separate [prison] terms therefor . .. shall be adjudged a habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life.’ (Emphasis added.) California Penal Code, § 644. The California court rejected, as we do, the argument that to invoke the statute it is necessary that the defendant have served the”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Davis v. State