¶1(dissenting). The defendants herein pled guilty before a Detroit Recorder’s Court judge to the offense of assault with intent to rob being armed (MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284) an included offense to the original charge against them of robbery armed. This plea was taken on March 6, 1972; from that plea both defendants appeal claiming they were not properly advised of various rights at the time of the plea, more particularly, their right to examine their accusers.
¶2I cannot concur in my brothers’ opinion; I would affirm the conviction.
¶3I have examined the 22 pages of plea transcript in this matter. The plea was very carefully and methodically taken by the trial judge. The defendants had their attorney present; the court asked them, among other things, whether or not they understood what a jury trial was and they answered in the affirmative. The court asked them if they ever had an opportunity to observe a jury trial in progress and they answered in the affirma*634tive; not only had they observed them, they had participated as witnesses. Defendants further pointed out that they had some experience themselves with trials and courts in that they had had previous police records.
¶4The court in its very direct and intensive examination, which was in question and answer form, explained that many cases which are tried before a jury result in acquittals. They explained to the judge, step by step, their part in this crime. After this entire discourse, the court again asked the defendants if they still wished to plead guilty at which time they answered yes.
¶5But, more particularly, in answer to their claim of error, the court asked the defendants if they knew that they or their lawyers could question the witnesses and whether or not they knew they could subpoena witnesses on their own behalf. They answered yes to both parts of that question.
¶6I don’t think a blackboard with drawings is necessary to point out to defendants who are represented by able counsel that when the court advised them that they and their counsel may examine witnesses that this means in effect accusers. It must be clear to all involved, especially those with experience in the courts, as these defendants were, that accusers are witnesses and accusers have to be witnesses. I am afraid that my colleagues have attempted a play on semantics in allowing these two armed robbers’ release by a very, very technical reading of the cases and rules.
¶7The defendants also cite as error the court’s use of their juvenile records before imposing sentence. I have written to this in the past and my position has been clearly stated, which is, briefly, that I feel a sentencing judge needs to know the entire character and personality of an individual he is *635attempting to place under some supervisory control for possible rehabilitation. See People v Luster, 44 Mich App 38 (1972).