Volume 46 — New Jersey Law Reports

Of these two eases, transferred from the District Court of Jersey City, and tried together, the facts are as follows: Wilhelmina Wagner rented a store, being the first floor of the four-story house 543 Henderson street, to William Barry in May, 1883, on a monthly letting for $15 per month, payable in advance, and he went into possession.

On rule to show cause. The cause was tried at the Passaic Circuit, at January Term, 1883. On Sunday evening, December 11th, 1881, the plaintiff took passage in a train of the defendant at Wortendyke, for Paterson, having in her possession a ticket which entitled - her to a passage upon that train.

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>1. The crime of indecent exposure is committed if a person intentionally makes such exposure in the view from the windows of two neighboring dwelling-houses.</p> <p>2. It is not necessary that any person should actually see such exposure if it was made in a public place with the intent that it should be seen, and persons were there who could have seen if they had looked.</p>

<p>On demurrer to plea.</p>

On error to Camden Circuit Court. The defendants above named became sureties on a bail-bond given to the sheriff of Camden county by one Horace Ham-mill, who had been arrested upon a capias ad respondendum issued out of the Camden Circuit Court, at the suit of Atkinson, in an action of assumpsit. Hammill did not appear, according to the condition of the bail-bond, by putting in special bail. Atkinson took an assignment of the bail-bond and brought suit-upon it.

<p>On demurrer to narr.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause why a new trial should not be- • granted.</p>

<p>The publication by savings bank directors that “directors and stockholders are personally responsible for its debls,” does not constitute a contract with those who may make deposits; but if the statement is false it lays the foundation for an action for deceit.</p>

The plaintiff and defendant, both minors, were gunning on November 7th, 1882, in South Brunswick township, Middle-sex county.

On information in quo warranto for defendant to answer to the state by what warrant he claims to hold and enjoy the office of chosen freeholder of the county of Hudson, from the eighth assembly district.

<p>The failure of the sheriff to serve a summons before the original return-day, and a subsequent alteration by him, extending the time of return, after the action was barred by the statute of limitations, will not defeat the suit if the defendant has appeared and pleaded, without objection, and the writ was tested and delivered to the sheriff before the statute became a bar.</p>

<p>,1. Settlement of a child born of a slave after July 4th, 1804, will be gained by full seven years’ service with a master who has a right to .such service by legal transfer thereof from the owner of the slave mother.</p> <p>2. Abandonment of an order of removal by an overseer in whose favor it is, is a bar to another proceeding for the removal of the same pauper between the same parties except upon the ground of a subsequently-acquired settlement. •</p>

On rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against John Cuban, John E. Kilroy, John Kearns, Eli K«. Solliday, John W. Smith and B. Way Ter Woert as for contempt.

<p>1. Where a charter of a municipal corporation requires a proceeding to be instituted by an ordinance, it cannot be effected by a resolution merely, the latter being wanting in the solemnities of the former, and is not regarded as a legal equivalent.</p> <p>2. The charter of the city of Paterson provides that any legislative act of the board of aldermen shall be by ordinance passed by a vote of a majority of its members, and in case an ordinance involves the expenditure of money, the votes of two-thirds of the members of the board shall be necessary to its passage. The board of aldermen, by resolution, directed the construction of certain sewers and drains, and passed an ordinance for the issue of bonds to pay for the same; the mayor of the city declined to sign the bonds thus ordered to be issued. Held, 1. That the act of the board of aldermen was legislative in its character, and could not be effected by resolution. 2. The mayor will not be compelled by mandamus to do an act against his objection in furtherance of a measure having its inception without legal authority and in violation of the charter provisions.</p>

<p>1. Under the third and fourth sections of the Eiparian act of March 31st, 1869, (Sev., p. 982,) the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company and its assigns may secure from the state a conveyance in fee of the lands naturally under water, lying in front of the lands owned by such corporation or its assigns, on paying therefor to the state $50 per foot ■ measured upon the bulkhead line in front of the lands included in the conveyance.</p> <p>2. The privilege of securing such a conveyance must be regarded as enhancing the value of the land, to the ownership of which the privilege-attaches, for the purpose of taxation.</p>

On certiorari. John Gilmartin and wife, natives of Ireland, came to America in 1860 from that country. In 1869, John Gil-martin gained a legal settlement in Marlboro township, Monmouth county, New Jersey, which he has retained and where he has resided ever since. When he came to this country in 1860 he left behind him in Ireland a daughter, Delia, who was born there, and who was then about two years old.

On rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, •commanding the respondents, the trustees of public schools in the city of Burlington, to meet together, and by resolution order, direct and instruct the teachers of the several public schools in said city to receive Gertrude Pierce, Rufus Pierce, ■Gilbert A. Pierce and Hannah Pierce, children of the relator, into said schools for the purposes of instruction, without any ■denial or abridgment of their rights and…

On September 4th, 1882, George H. Pierson made a proposition in writing to the common council of the town of Harrison, and thereby offered to construct suitable water-works to supply the town with water for fire protection and domestic purposes. He also proposed to organize a stock company for that purpose, and to do the work in a specified manner and before a fixed time.

On certiorari bringing up the resolution of the common council of the borough of Washington, granting a license to the defendant and the proceedings thereon.

<p>1. The board created by the act entitled “An act creating a county board, of commissioners of appeal in cases of taxation, and for equalizing assessments for taxes in the county of Hudson,” approved April 4th, 1873, {Pamph. L., p. 794,) is required to make an apportionment of state and county tax among the municipalities of that county. In so-doing, the board have no power to consider or determine whether any part of the county tax required to be raised by order of the chosen freeholders is or is not properly included in the order. The power of the board is merely to apportion the amounts fixed by the state and. county authorities.</p> <p>2. An objection to an item included in the sum ordered to be raised by the chosen freeholders oannot be made upon a certiorari bringing up for review nothing but the apportionment made by the board.</p> <p>3. The board has authority to equalize the valuations between the several assessment districts of the county, and to increase the valuations of specific pieces of property, and for those purposes to make investigations, &e. But their action in determining the valuations on which the apportionment is made will not be rendered invalid by refusal or neglect to alter valuations in the absence of proof produced of erroneous valuations, nor by refusal or neglect to investigate, at least, in the absence of proof produced of a prima fade case of error or of some reasonable ground to suspect error.</p>

On certiorari. An action in the court for the trial of small causes, brought by defendant in certiorari against prosecutor, had been regularly adjourned to. June 1st, 1883, at nine o’clock A. H., at Summit Hall, in the township of Summit, Union county. The justice, being unable to attend at that time and place, by reason of illness in his family, adjourned the cause while at his place of residence in another township and in the absence of the parties.

This certiorari brings up certain proceedings taken by the common council of the borough of Hightstown to vacate a license previously granted by that body to the prosecutor to-keep an inn and tavern in that borough.

On certiorari. ' The writ in this case brings up an assessment for taxes and certain proceedings taken to sell the land upon which the taxes were a lien.

This is an application for a writ of mandamus to the respondents, requiring them to take bail upon a conviction, judgment and writ of error taken in the case of State v. Rufus W. Peacock. ' '

<p>On motion to strike out replications.</p>

This is upon rule to show cause why a mandamus should •not issue to the respondent, the treasurer of Plainfield, commanding him to pay to the collector of Union county the sum of $2478.61, with interest from November 2d, 1883.

This writ of certiorari brings up assessments of taxes for state, county and city purposes, made by the authorities of the city of Plainfield for the years 1880 and 1881.

This writ brings up a resolution passed by the defendants appropriating the sum of “ fifteen thousand dollars for regulating, cleaning and keeping in repair the streets and highways of the city of Passaic,” and so much of an ordinance providing for the assessment and collection of the said appropriation and all resolutions relating to the expenditure of such sum.

The writ in this case brings up a second re-assessment of benefits upon tracts of land in the township of Montclair, in the county of Essex, alleged to arise from the laying out of a certain avenue by the Essex public road board.

<p>1. Assessment of taxes on personal property of prosecutor, in 1882, in Jersey City. The property, at the time of the assessment, was in-Jersey City, on premises in possession of the prosecutor. The prosecutor, at the time, resided in the city of Elizabeth. Held, that the act of 1869, which provides for the taxation of personal property, where found, in the county of Hudson and some other counties, was rendered nugatory by the amended constitution which went into effect in 1875.</p> <p>2. In 1882 the general tax law was in force in Jersey City, under which personal property is assessed in the township or ward where the owner resides.</p>

<p>On certiorari. In matter of road.</p>

<p>1. Unless it be otherwise expressly ordered by the court, a rule to show cause why there should not be a new trial supersedes the rule for ¿udgment nisi entered upon return of the poslea.</p> <p>2. Judgment final should be entered as of the date when the rule discharging rule to show cause is entered in the minutes.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the common council of Newark, to review certain resolutions for the appointment of lieutenants of police.</p>

On error to Supreme Court. The suit was in covenant. The declaration was in substance as follows, viz.: That March 6th, 1880, by an indenture of lease made between the plaintiff of one part, and the defendant of the other part, (“ one part of which said indenture, sealed with the seal of the said defendant, the said plaintiff now brings here into court, the date whereof is a certain day and year therein mentioned, to wit, the day and year aforesaid,) a copy of which said…

This suit was brought to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, caused by the negligence of one Eoberts in the management of a horse and cart of which he was the driver. The horse and cart were owned by the city. Eoberts was employed as driver, and was directed by a member of the board of public works of Jersey City.

<p>1. The provision of the mechanics’ lien law, that the time of issuing the summons to enforce the lien shall be endorsed on the claim within one year after the date of the latest item in the claim, or within thirty days after due notice from the owner to the claimant to sue, is mandatory, and in case of non-compliance with it the lien will be discharged according to the terms of the statute.</p> <p>2. The powers of amendment conferred on the courts by the act do not enable them to restore the lien when it has been discharged by noncompliance with this mandate.</p> <p>3. When a claimant has been notified by an owner to sue within thirty days he cannot escape the obligations arising from the notice by thereafter filing a new claim for the same debt.</p>

<p>In a case where there is legal evidence of fraud, the question whether the fraud was satisfactorily proved cannot be considered on writ of error.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The act of March 12th, 1880, (Pamph. L., p. 321,) is a local and not a general law. The grouping together in a single act of a number of special or local laws does not constitute a general law.</p> <p>2. Whether the requisite notice has been given of an intention to apply for the passage of a local law is a subject matter for judieial inquiry under article IV., section 7, paragraph 9, of the constitution.</p> <p>3. The admissions of parties to the suit are not competent proof to show that due notice has not been given. What the law is cannot be determined by the agreement of suitors.</p> <p>4. Salaries of prosecutors of the pleas must be fixed by general and not by local laws. Such laws regulate the internal affairs of counties.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see 16 Vroom 480.</p>

<p>1. An attempt to steal, accompanied by an overt act or acts towards its commission, constitutes an attempt to commit larceny.</p> <p>2. The overt act or acts must be such as will apparently result, in the usual and natural course of events, if not hindered by extraneous causes, in the commission of the crime itself.</p> <p>3. Mere preliminary preparations are not the overt acts required.</p>

<p>A passenger upon a ferry-boat, who has paid his fare and is forcibly and unlawfully ejected by an agent of the company, is entitled, by way of damages, to a reasonable compensation for the indignity and consequent injury to his feelings on being thus treated.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 16 Vroom 61.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 15 Vroom 165.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 15 Vroom 354.</p>

<p>On error to Hudson Circuit.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 15 Vroom 347.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme ■Court, see Í6 Vroom 91.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court. For opini©n of Supreme: Court, see 16 Vooom 302.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 16 Vroom 318.</p>

On case certified from Essex Circuit. At the trial of the issues iu the above-stated cause before the court, without a jury, the following proofs were made:. I. That on August 29th, 1857, one Philip McMahon deposited with the defendants, a savings institution at Newark, the sum of $1000, and an account with him in that name and as No. 105 was then opened. He received a deposit-book, of which the exhibit Deposit Book No. 104 shows the form.

<p>On writ of error to the Middlesex Circuit.</p>

<p>1. Tlie president of a corporation has no power, in virtue of his office as president, to execute a bond and warrant of attorney for the entry of a judgment by confession against the corporation.</p> <p>2. The powers of the president of a corporation over its business and property are strictly the powers of an agent—powers delegated to him by the directors, who are the managers of the corporation and the persons in whom the control of its business and property is vested.</p> <p>3. The president of a corporation, organized for business purposes, is its chief executive officer, and in virtue of his office has authority to perform all acts of an ordinary nature which, by usage or necessity, are incident to his office, and may bind the corporation by contracts in the usual course of business. His authority to act for the corporation may also be enlarged beyond those.powers which are inherent in his office, but those are cases where the agency of the officer has arisen from the assent of the directors, from their consent and acquiescence in permitting him to assume the direction and control of its business, and are instances of the application of the principle that a principal will be liable for the acts of his agent within the apparent authority conferred upon him.</p> <p>4. That the president of a corporation is the owner of nearly all its capital stock, and is its superintendent and treasurer and the active-manager of its affairs, and was accustomed to borrow money for the company’s use, will give him no power to encumber its property by a mortgage or judgment confessed for money borrowed.</p> <p>5. The corporation having become insolvent, its receiver, as the representative of creditors, has the capacity to take the objection that a judgment against the corporation by confession was not obtained in. such a manner as to be binding upon the corporation.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause why a verdict for the plaintiff should not be set aside.</p>

On demurrer to declaration. This suit was brought by the payees of checks or orders on the defendant, a banking corporation, which on presentation were refused payment, on January 20th, 1877.

Action of debt on a bond given by defendant to A. G. Plume and J. Lockwood, dated November 23d, 1872, with condition to pay $3500 in one year from date; assigned to-plaintiff March 1st, 1873. On February 14th, 1882, plaintiff filed a bill to foreclose the mortgage, and the mortgaged lands^ were sold under decree of foreclosure September 12th, 1882,, for $1000. This action on the bond secured by the mortgage was begun August 23d, 1883.

<p>1. The twentieth section of the act of March 23d, 1859, {Rev., p. 1017, pi.-120,) applies only to injuries resulting from the neglect of such repairs as are required by the general road law to be made. The injury for which suit is brought must result from the insufficiency or want of repair of a public road.</p> <p>2. The neglect of sidewalks required to be made by a subsequent special law pertaining to the township of Union {Pamph. L. of 1874, p. 237,) is not within the terms of section 20 of the act of 1859. A township is suable only for such neglect as makes all townships liable under section 20.</p> <p>3. By the act of 1860, p. 554, it is provided that the act of March 23d,. 1859, shall not apply to Bergen county. The re-enactment of the act of 1859 in 1874 {Rev., p. 1013, § 99,) did not extend it over Bergen county. The intent of the revision was to continue the act of 1859 in force with the effect previously given to it.</p>

<p>On demurrer to narr.</p>

<p>It being the duty of the public authorities to erect and maintain proper fences along the raceways adjacent to the streets dedicated by defendant to the public use, the defendant may lawfully raise the raceway walls and increase the flow of water to its mills so long as the safeguards which the public is bound to erect against the danger arising from the original excavations, will furnish ample protection against any additional danger created by the change in the construction and use of the raceways.</p>

<p>1. An unauthorized person gaining possession of a public office by force or fraud has no right of action against the public for the prescribed-fees or salary for services rendered during such usurpation.</p> <p>2. Compensation attached to the office is not promised to him by expression or legal implication, and the services are voluntarily rendered.</p>

On certiorari. This writ brings up for review the proceedings and written •determination of Robert Vanderburgh and John M. Lucas, two justices of the peace of Middlesex county, and William I. Huffman and John A. Mount, surveyors of the highways of the township of Monroe in said county, who were called to view and determine respecting encroachment upon one of the public highways in said township, within the limit and division of Mount Davison, overseer.

<p>The notice required by the fifty-sixth section of the Tax act is not necessarily to be served upon the person whose tax is proposed to be raised. It may be served upon an agent whose duty involves that of communicating the fact of such notice to the principal.</p>

<p>1. The General Railroad act, (Éev., p. 925,) does not authorize corporations organized under it to take, by condemnation, more land than a strip one hundred feet wide inter términos.</p> <p>2. If, under the General .Railroad act, a corporation presents a petition for the condemnation of more land than it is authorized to condemn averring its inability to agree with the owner for the purchase of the whole, the proceedings will, on certiorari, be set aside m toto.</p> <p>3. Persons named in a petition for the condemnation of land as claimants of some interest in the land, and thereby made parties to the proceedings, may, by certiorari, question the authority of the petitioner to institute such proceedings, without showing that they really have an interest in the land.</p>

<p>In attachment. On motion to vacate judgment.</p>

<p>On certiorari to review an ordinance of the board of aider-men of Jersey City.</p>

On certiorari to review taxes for the years 1876 to 1881, both inclusive, levied under the act of April 2d, 1873. Rev., p. 1166. By an act approved February 26th, 1847, the Somerville and Easton Railroad Company was incorporated, and power was given it to hold land at the commencement and termination of said railroad at Somerville and the Delaware river.

<p>1. A motion to quash an indictment removed to this court by certiorari, can only be made for objections apparent on the face of the record.</p> <p>~2. The act of March 26th, 1874, (Sev., p. 493,) exempts from the operation of the sixtieth section of the Crimes act, offences committed in such cities as, having power to pass ordinances providing a punishment for the unlicensed sale of spirituous liquors, have passed such ordinances. But such exemption continues only so long as such ordinances remain in force and ceases upon their repeal.</p> <p>3. Whether such ordinances are in force in any city, is a question of fact which cannot be considered on a motion to quash.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. When, after a partial vacation of an assessment of damages and benefits for a street improvement, a re-assessment is made thereof in the village of South Orange, the board of assessments must take into consideration, and determine all the damages and all the benefits from • the improvement, in order that the re-assessment, with respect to the parties concerned, may be made as required by the charter, in proportion to the peculiar benefits derived from the improvement, and to the extent of such benefits. If the report of the board shows that they did not so act, the re-assessment cannot be sustained.</p> <p>2. The board of trustees of the village, in ratifying the re-assessment, altered it by increasing the assessments for benefits on prosecutors. Held, that if that board possess power to alter an assessment in substance, it cannot be done arbitrarily, but it must appear that there has been an adjudication that the alteration is one proper to be made; if the alteration increases an assessment for benefits, it must appear that the board examined and adjudged the benefits to be greater than those found by the board of assessments.</p>

On certiorari. This writ brings up the condemnation of a sloop, belonging to the prosecutor, for a violation of the provisions of “ An act for the better enforcement, in Maurice River cove and Delaware bay, of the act entitled ‘ An act for the preservation of clams and oysters/ ” &c., and the supplements thereto. Rev., p. 140.

<p>An unqualified refusal to deliver goods to an owner upon demand, by one-in whose custody they were left by an officer who had taken them without authority, is a ground for an action in trover.</p>

<p>1. The act for the organization of the National Guard, authorizes the division commander to disband a company for mutinous conduct.</p> <p>2. Such action relates to the organization of the militia, and is cognizable only by the military authorities.</p> <p>3. Alleged grievances growing out of such action may be laid before the commander-in-chief, by the officers or men of the company ordered to be disbanded.</p> <p>4. An order of disbandment made by the division commander is not rev.iewable in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>5. The section of the National Guard act, directing that officers of a disbanded company shall be placed on the retired list, is not in violation of the constitution of the state.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>■On certiorari.</p>

<p>It not appearing that the affidavit required, upon appeal from a judgment in the court for the trial of small causes, on verdict of a jury, was presented to the justice within the time limited by law for demanding an appeal, the Court of Common Pleas properly dismissed the appeal; and a mmdwnus to re-instate is refused.</p>

<p>On quo warranto.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. The writ below brought up an assessment made upon a certain farm in the township of Marlboro, in Monmouth county,, belonging to the heirs of Charles H. Conover, deceased. At the November Term, 1883, the assessment was, by the Supreme Court, in all things affirmed.

<p>Error to Camden Circuit.</p>

<p>4.n expression of opinion in the charge, which might have misled the jury, to the prejudice of the defendant—Held, error, even though the-general statement of the law in the charge was correct.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of that court, •see 16 Vroom 379.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of that court,, see 15 Vroom 456.</p>

<p>On error to the Hudson Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On error to the Somerset Circuit-.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

On case certified from the Camden Circuit. In February, 1882, the plaintiffs demised to Aaron I). W. Clark certain premises for the term of one year from March 25th, 1882, for the yearly rent of $600, payable in equal monthly payments. On the 5th of January, 1883, Aaron Clark recovered a judgment against Aaron D. W. Clark, the tenant, on which execution was issued on the same day, an'd delivered to the sheriff of the county of Camden.

On ease certified from the Hudson Circuit. f This suit was brought by a depositor in the Mechanics’ and Laborers’ Savings Bank in Jersey City, against the defendant, a director of the bank, to recover damages for false representations made by the defendant as to the solvency and condition of the bank, whereby the plaintiff was induced to leave in the bank money he had on deposit, which was lost by reason of the subsequent failure of the bank.

This action was brought to recover damages for the failure to deliver bonds of the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company. Titus & Scudder negotiated, in the winter of 1867-68, with one Columbus B. Guthrie, for the purchase of twenty-five of the company’s bonds of $1000 each for the sum of $5000. The bonds not having been delivered on demand, Titus & Scudder sued the company for damages for non-delivery.

<p>On certiorari to the District Court of the city of Paterson.</p>

<p>1. On trial of an indictment for unlawfully conveying or taking away a woman child under the age of fifteen years, with intent to seduce, &a.f under section 82 of the Crimes act, she is a competent witness to testify on behalf of the state.</p> <p>2. If the defendant brought her within this state from another, and here, with tile intent set out in the statute, interposed his will or persuasion between her and her guardian’s control, so as to overcome her intention to return to her home, the abduction is accomplished, and he may be indicted in this state.</p>

<p>.1. The special act of 1868, (Pamph. L., p. 72,) and the general laws, (Rev., pp. 1163, 1165,) authorising sale of lands for taxes, have not repealed section 34, by which timber, &c., on unimproved and untenanted lands may be sold.</p> <p>2. Where lands are listed by an insufficient description, and are sold for taxes, the sale will be set aside, but the assessment and the proceedings to collect the same, so far as to fix the lien apd charge upon the property and person, are amendable under act of 1881. Pamph. L., p. 194.</p>

In covenant. On case certified from the Hudson county Circuit Court upon the following agreed-upon statement of facts: The council of the city of Bayonne passed an ordinance ordering the opening of Avenue C from North avenue to the Morris canal, February 21st, 1871, and which was approved by the mayor February 24th, 1871. The final assessment map and the report of the commissioners were filed September 6th, 1871, and the same approved and confirmed September 28th, 1871.

<p>The limitation of the time of counsel by the trial court is a matter of discretion.</p>

On error to the Newark District Court. This writ brings up a judgment rendered in the First District Court of the city of Newark against the prosecutors in an action brought against them to recover damages resulting from the loss of a wagon, harness, whip and lap-robe, and for injuries to a horse, and the expenses of recovering possession of the horse, and in restoring him to a good condition.

On certiorari to Camden Common Pleas. The plaintiff let premises to one Wolfe, under a written lease for one year, rent payable monthly. The defendant, by his writing, guaranteed the payment of the rent. Suit was ■brought in the District Court of Camden and judgment re•covered for a balance of rent remaining unpaid by the tenant. 'This judgment was appealed to the Camden Pleas, and by the judgment; of that court was affirmed.

On rule to set aside judgment. December 24th, 1876, judgment was entered in this court, upon bond and warrant of attorney, against the defendants, who* were husband and wife, and in favor of the plaintiff, for '$2168.55.

<p>On certiorari to justice’s court.</p>

<p>The charter of the Morris Canal and Banking Company exempts from taxation property of the company used for the actual and necessary purposes of canal navigation. Such exemption held not to extend to a house and lot used for the residence of an assistant superintendent of the canal.</p>

Rule to change venue. This was a rule to show cause why the venue in the above cause should not be changed from the county of Morris to the county of Sussex.

<p>1. The Commissioners of Taxation act, approved March 20th, 1884, (Pamph. L.,p. 84,) is a general law and applicable to townships.</p> <p>2. In townships, the township committee is the legislative or governing body mentioned in the first section of the act.</p> <p>•3. When the local authorities are charged by law with the levying of taxes for only some of the objects specified in the act, or when their failure extends to only some of those objects, the powers of the commissioners of taxation will be likewise circumscribed.</p>

<p>1. The commissioners of taxation appointed under the act of March 20th, 1884, {Pamph. L., p. 84,) have no power to levy taxes for any purposes other than those particularly specified in the act.</p> <p>2. The commissioners are not the assessors intended by the supplement to “an act respecting executions,” approved March 27th, 1878. Pamph. L,, p. 182.</p>

<p>Ou rule to show cause for a mandamus.</p>

On certiorari. Rosa Funck, the plaintiff in certiorari, resided in Hoboken, and was in possession of a mare. Bryan. Smith, the defendant in certiorari, claimed that the mare liad been stolen from •him, and caused a search warrant to be issued by a justice of the peace in Jersey City for the seizure of the mare. Upon the seizure, the plaintiff employed an attorney-at-law in Jersey City to protect her interests before the justice.

<p>On certiorari to the Sussex Common Pleas.</p>

<p>On motion to quash indictment.</p>

<p>A special school tar, ordered by a special meeting of the voters, which ' was not called by the board of trustees, and of which the district clerk did not give notice, will be set aside.</p>

<p>1. The Proprietors of the Morris Aqueduct have power, through condemnation, to take lands and divert streams of water to such extent as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of incorporation, and, in so doing, are not confined to the territory stated in the act of 1862.</p> <p>2. The said incorporation, under the act of 1883, has power to extend its mains and to supply water outside the corporate limits of Morristown.</p> <p>3. To supply á city or town with water is a public purpose for a public benefit.</p> <p>4. The diversion of the waters of a spring or stream should not be allowed unless clearly necessary for the public good, and the question of necessity should be controlled by the court, and there should be satisfactory evidence of the need.</p>

<p>On motion to strike out plea.</p>

<p>Where a promissory note is discounted by a national bank in Nevr York, the New York statute forfeiting the entire debt is not applicable to the transaction. The federal act supersedes the state law, imposing penalties for usury, in so far as they pertain to national banks.</p>

<p>The term “ by-road ” is used in the act of 1882, p. 213, exclusively in the sense which had been given to it by prior judicial construction. It does not apply to private roads laid out by surveyors of the highways.</p>

<p>Ou application for mandamus.</p>

<p>Although, where the judgment of a justice of the peace is not docketed in conformity with the statute, it may be attacked collaterally and treated as a nullity, yet the party aggrieved by the docketing may certify it for the judgment of this court as to its validity, without waiting until his property is sold, and thereby incurring the risk of loss which would fall upon him if he mistook the law.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

On certiorari bringing up the determination of justices and surveyors of highways in respect to encroachments on a public road duly laid out in the township of Holland, Hunterdoncounty.

<p>In a township which has elected to maintain its roads by hire, and which has omitted to raise sufficient road money to open and work a public highway newly laid out therein, there is now, since the repeal of section 56 of the Road act, by the supplement of March 23d, 1883, [Pamph. L., p. 165,) no power in the ovérseer of the road district to which such road is assigned, to do such work or to compel the same to be done; consequently no duty is devolved on him in respect thereto, which will be enforced by mandamus.</p>

<p>1. The Court of Common Pleas may amend the return of a public road under the provisions of section 98 of the Road act.</p> <p>2. Notice of the proceeding to amend given in the manner and for the time directed by that court, is sufficient.</p> <p>3. By section 98 the court may restrict the amendment to certain particulars, or direct the mode in which the determination of the questions presented is to be reached by the surveyors, but the court cannot determine those questions or impose its determination on the surveyors.</p> <p>4. Upon an amended return every person affected by new matter, inserted by the amendments, is entitled to relief by caveat or appeal in the same manner and for the same length of time as if the amended' return were an original return filed at the time of the amendments ^ but no other person will be entitled to a renewed right of either caveat or appeal, by reason of the amendment of a return.</p>

<p>When one purchases lands at a sheriff’s sale under foreclosure of a mortgage, which was prior in point of time to a recognizance of bail in a criminal case entered into by the owner of the land, and the foreclosure was before the passage of'the act of 1872 (Rev., p. 1223, g 69,) and the state was not a party thereto, a case is not made for any relief which can be afforded by this court.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court see 16 Vroom 87, 89. The statement of facts showed that the testator died January 28th, 1879, that his will was admitted to probate February 8th, 1879, and that an order to limit creditors was taken February 8th, 1879, under section 59, of the Orphans’ Court act.

On error to the Gloucester Circuit. This suit is an action of trespass to recover damages for an unlawful entry upon lands of the plaintiff, situate in the township of West Deptford, in the county of Gloucester, consisting in part of upland and in part of land under the waters of the Delaware river. The acts complained of as trespass were divers acts done in the working of a fishery in April and May, 1881.

<p>In error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>In error to Passaic Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. A cheek deposited by general endorsement of payee, and passed to his credit on the books of a bank, becomes the property of such bank, and may legally be transferred to a bona fide creditor.</p> <p>2. The words “for collection” appended to the endorsement limit the effect which the endorsement would have without them, and give authority to the holder only to collect for the benefit of the endorser.</p>

<p>In bastardy. On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court see 16 Vroom 488.</p>

On error to Supreme Court. James P. Dusenberry, administrator, &c., of Cephas JVL Woodruff, deceased, brought an action'of trespass on the case,, in the Supreme Court, against Henry S. Little, receiver of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, to recover damages for the death of said decedent, caused by the alleged wrongful act, neglect or default of the agents of said receiver in operating said railroad, under the statute. Rev., p. 294.

<p>In error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 16 Vroom 511.</p>