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46 R.I. 47

124 A 657

Ryan v. Hebert

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Decided June 4, 1924

Supreme Court of Rhode Island · decided 1924-06-04

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Section 20 (G. S. § 4378) was copied from the German Exchange Act, and some of its provisions are a departure from the prevailing rule in this country. This section has been subjected to severe criticism, but it has outlived it, due to the fact that the business world approves of it because it increases the negotiability of commercial paper and simplifies the proof in the recovery. Article by Charles L. MeKeehan, published in Bran-nan’s Negotiable Instrument Law. * * * “This- section covers at least five classes of cases: “(1) Where one adds to his signature to a negotiable instrument words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized. “(2) By necessary implication from this statute, as Mr. Crawford and Prof. Brannan have pointed out in their works on the Negotiable Instruments Law, it follows: Where one adds to his signature to a negotiable instrument words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is liable on the instrument if he was not duly authorized. “(3) Where one adds to his signature to a negotiable instrument words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character without disclosing his principal, he will be personally liable. “(4) By necessary implication it follows: Where one adds to Ms signature to a negotiable instrument words describing him as an agent or as filling a representative ch”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Pain v. Holtcamp

““Agents, When Not Liable. — Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Pain v. Holtcamp

Relies on Dunham v. Blood

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1924-06-04

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently July 1943

1 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

40192419301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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*48 Sweeney, J.

¶1 This is an action of assumpsit brought by the payee of a promissory note for $800.00 dated January 10, 1920. The note is signed “Est. of Felix Hebert, Frank Hebert, Adm’r.” At the close of the testimony the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant has brought the case to this court by his bill of exceptions claiming that the direction of a verdict was against the law and the evidence. The action is brought against Frank Hebert individually. The declaration contains a count on the note; a count stating that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $800.00 and gave him a note therefor which was not binding on the estate of Felix Hebert; a count for goods, and chattels sold and delivered, and the money counts. The plea is the general issue.

¶2 The testimony shows that the defendant purchased a truck on conditional sale October 28, 1919, and gave a series of notes therefor, some of which he paid. The note sued on is a renewal note for the balance due the plaintiff as commission on the sale of the truck. The plaintiff testified that the defendant also owed him $51.90 for repairs on the truck, gasoline and oil.

¶3 The defendant admitted buying the truck from the plaintiff; that he gave him the note in suit for the balance of his commission on the sale, and that it has not been paid. Defendant testified that he is in the teaming and trucking business in succession to his father. It does not appear in evidence when or where defendant was appointed administrator upon the estate of Felix Hebert, nor does it appear that he purchased the truck for the estate or that he had any authority to do so.

¶4 The defendant claims that he made the note in a representative capacity on behalf of his principal and that he is not liable personally, although he had no authority to make the note. Sec. 26, Chap. 200, General Laws, 1909, provides,, among other things, that where a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs (a negotiable instrument) in a representative capacity, he is not liable, if he was duly *49 authorized. The plaintiff claims that, under this section, the defendant is personally liable on the note as he was not duly authorized to sign it.

Malcolm D. Champlin, for plaintiff. Greene, Kennedy & Greene, for defendant.

¶5 The undoubted effect of this section is to render one signing for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, personally liable on the instrument, if he acts without authority. Selover on Negotiable Instruments, 2nd ed. p. 31; Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc. v. Gross, (Conn.) 120 Atl. 596. In Dunham v. Blood, 207 Mass. 512, it was held that a trustee who signed a note as such, without authority, was personally liable on the note. As the defendant had no authority to sign the note for the estate of Felix Hebert, he is personally liable on it.

¶6 All of the defendant’s exceptions are overruled and the case is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict.

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