¶1(concurring). The writer concurs in the reasoning and result reached in the court’s *315opinion in this case. However, there is one puzzling incident during the taking of testimony as to custody placement of the three minor children that warrants special attention and requires special comment.
¶2In this state a family court judge always has the right, often has the duty, to take affirmative steps to determine and protect the rights of minor children who are concerned and affected parties in divorce or separation actions involving their parents.
¶3Such affirmative steps include the right of the family court judge to appoint a family service agency or social service investigator to investigate, evaluate alternatives and recommend to the court the custody placement most likely to serve the best interests of the minor children involved.
¶4Such affirmative steps also include the right to appoint an attorney as guardian ad litem for the minor children to serve as the legal representative or advocate for the children’s rights and interests at the time of hearing or trial.
¶5Here the trial court properly and prudently appointed such guardian ad litem to protect the rights and represent the interest of the three minor children of the divorcing parties. In appointing such guardian ad litem for the children, the trial court set forth the purpose to be served and the responsibility of the attorney appointed as guardian in these words: “. . . to represent and act for and protect the interests of the three minor children of the parties hereto and to appear and represent said children at the hearing scheduled herein.” (Emphasis supplied.)
¶6*316What is puzzling in this record is that it appears that the attorney appointed as guardian ad litem submitted a written report or memorandum of his findings and conclusions. Counsel for the wife and husband stipulated and agreed that such written statement be accepted by the trial court and made part of the record in this case.
¶7If, as is not the case here, such written “report” by the guardian ad litem would be in lieu of his actual presence at and full participation in the hearing, it falls short of providing adequate legal representation of the rights and interests of the children. An attorney appointed to represent a minor in delinquency proceedings in a juvenile court accepts a responsibility not discharged by his filing a written statement or report to the court. A juvenile offender given no more than that would not be accorded effective assistance of competent counsel. Where there is reason to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children in a family court case, there is reason to insist upon both presence and participation of appointed counsel in the hearing directly affecting the present and future well-being of such children.
¶8If, as was the case here, the written “report” of the guardian ad litem for the children was submitted in addition to actual presence and full participation of the guardian in the custody hearing, there remains reason to flash, not a Stop sign, but a Caution signal. The role of a court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem is that of advocate. He has the right to produce witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and argue to the court. The role of the court-appointed social agency or investigator is that of a qualified expert in the field of child custody placements. He is expected to investigate, evaluate, recommend and report. His report or recommendations must be made available to the litigants or their counsel
¶9The writer concurs with the court’s holding that where, as here, the attorneys for the wife and husband stipulated and agreed that a written report by the guardian ad litem for the children be accepted and made part of the report, neither has the standing to challenge on appeal the court’s doing what both asked the court to do. Nonetheless it is important that the distinction between the report of a social investigator and the participation of a guardian ad litem in a trial neither be blurred nor ignored.
¶10Kritzik v. Kritzik (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 442, 124 N. W. 2d 581; Wendland v. Wendland (1965), 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N. W. 2d 185; Dees v. Dees (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N. W. 2d 282.
¶11Kritzik v. Kritzik, supra; Dees v. Dees, supra.
¶12 Koslowsky v. Koslowsky (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 275, 283, 163 N. W. 2d 632; Dees v. Dees, supra; Johnson v. Johnson (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 237, 245, 166 N. W. 2d 230; Lacey v. Lacey (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N. W. 2d 142.
¶13Larson v. Larson (1966), 30 Wis. 2d 291, 140 N. W. 2d 230.