Cetel’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or (2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fiorentino v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 4 Pension Plan · 568 F. Supp. 2d 556 - Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of NJ

2. “‘the New Jersey RICO statute was and should be consistent with the federal RICO statute.' ” Ross v. Celtron Int’l Inc., 494 F.Supp.2d 288 , 302 n. 4 (D.N.J.2007) (citing Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 494 , 510 (3d Cir.2006)). 18 . While Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Bank of America, National Ass'n · 784 F. Supp. 2d 508 - District 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen, L.P.

3. “By its terms then, ERISA’s statute of limitations provision offers a choice of periods, depending on “whether the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the breach....” Kurz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996). In Gluck v. Unisys Corp., we established that: Actual knowledge of a breach or violation requires that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of all material facts necessary to understand that some claim exists, which facts could include necessary opinions of experts, knowledge of a transactions’s harmful consequences, or even actual harm. 960 F.2d 1168 , 1178 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). We have thus stated that for purposes of determining actual knowledge, it must be shown that “plaintiffs actually knew not only of the events that occurred which constitute the breach or violation but also that those events supported a claim of breach of fiduciary duty or violation.” Montrose Med. Group Participating Savs. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In other words, where a claim is for breach of fiduciary duty, to be charged with actual knowledge “requires knowledge of all relevant facts at least sufficient to give the plaintiff knowledge that a fiduciary duty has been breached or ERISA provision violated.” Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hugler v. Sherrod