Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

460 U.S. 1102

Spencer v. Israel, Warden

Supreme Court of the United States · decided April 18, 1983

Relies on In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Sandstrom v. Montana · Hazra v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided April 18, 1983

How this case has been cited

Cited by 265 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2014 · most notably Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates (1983), State v. Delva (1991)

128 federal appellate · 15 district · 42 state decisions

15901983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

¶1

A defendant's right to due process is violated when the trial judge, in charging the jury on the issue of criminal intent, "require[s] the jury, if satisfied as to [specified] facts . . ., to find intent unless the defendant offer[s] evidence to the contrary." Sandstrom v. Montana,442 U.S. 510, 515, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). Such a presumption is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship,397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

¶2

At petitioner's trial on the charge of first-degree murder, the trial judge twice instructed the jury as follows:

¶3

"When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all of the natural, probable and usual consequences of his deliberate acts. If one person assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon likely to kill, and the person thus assaulted dies therefrom, then when there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the legal and natural presumption is that death was intended."

¶4

For reasons fully elaborated by three federal judges who have considered the constitutionality of an identical instruction, the instruction in this case was impermissible because it described a mandatory presumption of intent. See Pigee v. Israel,670 F.2d 690, 697-699 (CA7) (Baker, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 459 U.S. ---, 103 S.Ct. 103, 74 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982); Austin v. Israel, 516 F.Supp. 461 (E.D.Wis.1981); Harris v. Israel, 515 F.Supp. 568 (E.D.Wis.1981). The decision below, which denied petitioner's request for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause to appeal, therefore cannot be squared with Sandstrom. I would grant certiorari to correct the lower court's clear departure from this Court's precedents.

/460/us/1102 · .json · Public domain