Guiles v. Marineau’s Empirical Analysis
461 F.3d 320 · 2006
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 2 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 19 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2020
9 federal appellate · 2 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District · Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire · Cohen v. California · Ginsberg v. New York · Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) schools have wide discretion to prohibit speech that is less than obscene— to wit, vulgar, lewd, indecent or plainly offensive speech, Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-85 , 106 S.Ct. 3159 ; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 562 ; (2) if the speech at issue is “school-sponsored,” educators may censor student speech so long as the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 , 108 S.Ct. 562 ; and (3) for all other speech, meaning speech that is neither vulgar, lewd, indecent or plainly offensive under Fraser , nor school-sponsored under Hazelwood , the rule of Tinker applies. Schools may not regulate such student speech unless it would materially and substantially disrupt classwork and discipline in the school. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 , 89 S.Ct. 733 .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“the phrase ‘plainly offensive’ as used in Fraser cannot be so broad as to be triggered whenever a school decides a student’s expression conflicts with its ‘educational mission’ or claims a legitimate pedagogical concern. Were that the rule then Fraser would effectively swallow [Kuhlmeier ]’s holding that school officials may censor student speech if (1) the censorship reasonably relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern, and (2) the speech is school sponsored. Indeed if schools were allowed to censor on such a wide-ranging basis, then Tinker would no longer have any effect.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Proceeding according to the understanding that Tinker applies to all non-school-sponsored student speech that is not lewd or otherwise vulgar, we note that if the “material and substantial interference” test is meant to describe vocal protests and disputes of similar character and magnitude, schools must tolerate a great deal of student speech that is not lewd or vulgar. Put differently, Tinker established a protective standard for student speech under which it cannot be suppressed based on its content, but only because it is substantially disruptive.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.