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461 So. 2d 1033

461 So.2d 1033

10 Fla.L.Weekly 169

Docket No. 84-740.

Moosbrugger v. State

Danny Paul MOOSBRUGGER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided January 11, 1985.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1985-01-11

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently September 1993

6 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The crime defined by the statute, knowing violations of any statute, rule or regulation for an improper motive, is simply too open-ended to limit prosecutorial discretion in any reasonable way. The statute could be used, at best, to prosecute, as a crime, the most insignificant of transgressions or, at worst, to misuse the judicial process for political purposes. We find it susceptible to arbitrary application because of its "catch-all" nature.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 469 So. 2d 733 - State v. Jenkins

Relies on Trushin v. State · 356 So. 2d 306 - State v. DeLeo · 454 So. 2d 79 - State v. Jenkins

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-01-11

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*1034 Jesse J. Bennett, Jr., Bennett & Bennett, P.A., Winter Haven, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Gary O. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

¶3GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.

¶4The state filed an information charging appellant:

[T]hen and there being a public servant, to-wit, a deputy sheriff with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself knowingly did refrain from performing a duty imposed upon the said DANNY PAUL MOOSBRUGGER by law, to-wit, in that he did fail to turn in a stolen two-way radio into the Polk County Sheriffs Department evidence room and fill out a report regarding the recovery of the radio and failed in any way to report the recovery of said stolen two-way radio to any law enforcement agency once he was informed the radio was stolen, in violation of Section 839.25, Florida Statutes.

¶5The appellant was found guilty and placed on probation.

¶6Appellant now contends that section 839.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), the statute under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional. This statute reads as follows:

(1) "Official misconduct" means the commission of one of the following acts by a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to cause unlawful harm to another:
(a) Knowingly refraining, or causing another to refrain, from performing a duty imposed upon him by law; or... .

¶7While this point was not argued in the trial court, the facial validity of a statute may be raised for the first time on appeal. Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1983).

¶8In State v. Jenkins, 454 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), our sister court recently held this very statute unconstitutional. In that case, the state sought to prosecute a property appraiser for failing to assess back taxes on certain property. The court reasoned that the language of subsection (a) was at least as vague and open to arbitrary and capricious application as subsection (c) of the 1977 statute which was struck down by the supreme court in State v. DeLeo, 356 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1978). We agree. There is simply no way of determining which of the myriad of public servants' duties are "imposed ... by law." The words of DeLeo in referring to subsection (c) are equally applicable to subsection (a).

"The crime defined by the statute, ..., is simply too open-ended to limit prosecutorial discretion in any reasonable way. The statute could be used, at best, to *1035 prosecute, as a crime, the most insignificant of transgressions or, at worst, to misuse the judicial process for political purposes. We find it susceptible to arbitrary application because of its `catch-all' nature."

¶9454 So.2d at 81.

¶10We reverse the judgment of conviction and declare section 839.25(1)(a) to be unconstitutional.

¶11SCHEB and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.

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