Eugene W. And Marie P. Fireoved, in Nos. 71-1565 v. United States of America, in Nos. 71-1566, 71-1567’s Empirical Analysis
462 F.2d 1281 · 1972
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently July 1991
9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 26 U.S.C. § 306
Relies on United States v. Davis · United States v. Parker · Chamberlin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Two Cases). Toner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Carl v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Schrock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Pierce v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · Trotz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'one of the principal purposes' was motivated by 'tax avoidance[,]'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Congress realized the general lack of a tax avoidance purpose when a person sells all of his control in a corporation and then either simultaneously or subsequently disposes of his section 306 stock. However, when only a portion of the underlying common stock is sold, and the taxpayer retains essentially all the control he had previously, it would be unrealistic to conclude that Congress meant to give that taxpayer the advantage of section 306(b)(4)(B) when he ultimately sells his section 306 stock. Cf. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 , 90 S.Ct. 1041 , 25 L.Ed.2d 323 (1970). * * * although Mr. Fireoved did sell a portion of his voting stock prior to his disposition of the section 306 stock, he retained as much control in the corporation following the sale of his common stock as he had prior to the sale. Under these circumstances it is not consonant with the history of the legislation to conclude that Congress intended such a sale of underlying common stock to exempt the proceeds of the disposition of section 306 stock from treatment as ordinary income. Accordingly, the district court erred when it held that any of the preferred shares Mr. Fireoved redeemed were not subject to section 306(a) by virtue of section 306(b)(4)(B). [ 462 F.2d at 1289-1290 ; fn. refs, omitted; emphasis in original.]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“If it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary— (A) that the distribution, and the disposition or redemption, or (B) in the case of a prior or simultaneous disposition (or redemption) of the stock with respect to which the section 306 stock disposed of (or redeemed) was issued, that the disposition (or redemption) of the section 306 stock, was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.