¶1*483J. B. Tietz (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
¶2David Fox, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), David R. Nissen, J. Kent Steele, Asst. U. S. Attys., Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
¶3Before CHAMBERS and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and FREY,* District Judge.
¶6Walker appeals from the judgment convicting him of violating 50 U.S.C. App. § 462, refusing to obey the order of his Selective Service Board to submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States.
¶7The principal issue on appeal concerns the validity of Walker’s 1-A classification.
¶8The record reveals that Walker, shortly after being classified 1-A (available for military service) and before being ordered to report for induction, filed with his Local Board an SSS Form 150 in which he asserted a claim of exemption from both combatant and noncombatant training and service in the Armed Forces, by reason of religious training and belief, conscientiously opposing participation in war in any form, and requested a 1-0 classification (conscientious objector).
¶9The Board summarily denied his claim but thereafter reopened the matter at Walker’s request and afforded him a personal appearance. However, the Board again denied him a 1-0 classification, on the ground that his professed religious beliefs were not sincerely held.1 The Appeal Board, without assigning the basis for its action, again classified Walker 1-A, presumptively for the reason assigned by the Local Board. United States v. Kember, 437 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 1392, 28 L.Ed.2d 662 (1971).
¶10We are clear from our examination of the record that the Board’s determination of Walker’s lack of sincerity has a “basis in fact.” Bergman v. United States, 420 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1969). The principal question- — since Walker had “met the statutory criteria” [Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966)] — involves a highly subjective matter — the claimant’s honesty and good faith. The Board noted that Walker, during his interview, was “evasive in his answers”; clearly this fact was a proper one to consider in determining Walker’s credibility. Moreover, Walker acknowledged that he had used marihuana, contrary to the tenets of his religion; this fact too was relevant in that it tended to show the depth of his religious convictions. And, in addition, Walker had delayed for a considerable time before asserting his conscientious *484objector claim.2 Salamy v. United States, 379 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1967). In sum, there is “some proof that is incompatible with the registrant’s proof of exemption.” Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396, 74 S.Ct. 152, 157, 98 L.Ed. 132 (1953).
¶11Walker’s remaining contention is quickly answered. This Circuit has consistently upheld against attacks on due process grounds the portion of 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b), which in terms provides that “No person other than a registrant shall have the right to appear in person before the local board. . . .” United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1970); Uffelman v. United States, 230 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1957).
¶12Judgment affirmed.