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462 So. 2d 1272

Docket No. 85-C-1.

Watermeier v. Watermeier

Olga Marie Stone WATERMEIER v. John Joseph WATERMEIER, III. In re John J. WATERMEIER, III.

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Decided January 11, 1985.

Louisiana Court of Appeal · decided 1985-01-11

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. Such factors may include: (1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child. (2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child. (3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs. (4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment. (5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. (6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child. (7) The mental and physical health of each party. (8) The home, school, and community history of the child. (9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference. (10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party. (11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties. (12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Hiatt v. Duhe, Osborne v. McCoy

“We -do not intend or direct that the above procedure is ordained or is man- ■ datory when there is no objection from either side regarding the examination of any child by the judge. In such .case, the trial judge may examine any child or .witness in chambers, on or, off the. 'record, and with or without parents and/or counsel being present — provided all agree on the procedure.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including 178 So. 3d 288 - Sorrells v. Sorrells, 824 So. 2d 438 - Weaver v. Weaver

Relies on 412 So. 2d 1013 - State v. Arnaud · State v. Nails · 419 So. 2d 881 - State v. Edwards

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-01-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently May 2019 · most notably 687 So. 2d 685 - Gould v. Gould (1997), 841 So. 2d 1119 - Robison v. Lanford (2003)

39 state decisions

1301985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*1273 Darryl J. Carimi, Gretna, for relator.

¶2Robert C. Lowe, New Orleans, for respondent.

¶3Before CHEHARDY, KLIEBERT and BOWES, JJ.

¶4BOWES, Judge.

¶5The issue raised in this application for writs is whether or not, in a custody hearing, the trial judge has the right or discretion to interview in chambers, and without a record being made, over the objection of counsel for one of the parties (in this case the relator/father), a child, aged 5 years 7 months, who has thus far been in the custody of his mother. We hold that he does not, but the child may be interviewed in chambers on the record with both counsel present, as set out hereinafter.

¶6Although we have some guidance from some rather old Louisiana Supreme Court cases and we note that several appellate court cases[1], including some emanating from this court, have touched upon the subject of children testifying or being interviewed, in none of them has the exact issue before us been squarely presented or assigned as error so as to require a ruling.

¶7The issue before us presents these questions:

1. Can a child of this age be permitted to testify at all?
2. If so, how is his competency to be determined and under what circumstances?
3. Can the interview be conducted in chambers?
4. Should a record be made of the interview?
5. What participation, if any, should counsel for each side be permitted to take?

¶8Since at least 1893, Louisiana Revised Statute 13:3665[2] and 15:469[3] (and *1274 their predecessors) have been interpreted to stand for the very simple and precise proposition that a person's age, alone, is not the test of whether that person shall be allowed to appear and present testimony. Rather, the test is whether that person has "proper understanding." Whether the minor child has proper understanding, such that he will be allowed to testify, is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Sharp,338 So.2d 654 (La. 1976) [emphasis added]. While a child under the age of 12 may not be presumed to have a sufficient understanding, the law fixes no precise age when the witness shall be excluded, and determining the competency of the witness is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Richie,28 La.Ann. 327 (La. 1876) [child, six years old, found to have capacity to testify] [emphasis added]. Other cases allowing minor children to testify, age six or less, include: State v. Arnaud,412 So.2d 1013 (La.1982) [four years old]; State v. Skipper,387 So.2d 592 (La.1980) [five years old]; State v. Nails,255 La. 1070, 234 So.2d 184, 185 (La.1970); State v. Edwards,419 So.2d 881 (La.1982); State v. Richie, supra, and State v. Pace,301 So.2d 323 (La.1974) [six years old]. See also Chavigny v. Hava,125 La. 710, 51 So. 696 (1910):

"The testimony of a child, while it may be excluded, because of incompetency resulting from his tender years, cannot be excluded, under the rules of evidence, on the sentimental ground that he shall not be permitted to testify against his mother."

¶9Our Supreme Court, dealing with a domestic relations' lawsuit, has specifically stated that the admission of the testimony of a six year old child is a matter which addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court, and that under Louisiana Revised Statute 13:3665, age alone is not a bar to a child's testimony being elicited. Wilson v. Moser,210 La. 1021, 29 So.2d 49 (1946) [emphasis added].

¶10We, therefore, conclude that the child cannot be precluded from testifying or being interviewed on the basis of age alone.

¶11It also appears obvious to us that the competency of the child must be determined (under the above statutes and the applicable jurisprudence) by the trier of fact—in this case, the trial judge. The test of his competency shall be whether he is "a person of proper understanding", as required by LRS 13:3665. In order to relieve the child from as much pressure as possible from the "glare of the courtroom" and the possibly intimidating presence of his mother and father, we feel this should be done in chambers. It also appears that the jurisprudence sanctions and encourages such a procedure.

¶12Louisiana Civil Code article 146 not only permits a custody hearing to be held in the judge's chambers, but also directs the court to consider "the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference" in deciding what custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the child.

¶13The next questions before us involve whether a record should be made of the interview and the extent of the participation of counsel for each side. We have given this matter grave consideration and, whereas we are impressed by the very plausible argument of counsel for respondent that an interview by the judge alone (without a record being made and without the ominous presence of parents and counsel), would relieve the child of fear and tension so that he would be more inclined to talk freely and truthfully, we cannot agree. To do so would do violence to the basic concepts of our adversary system because the attorneys and parties, as well as the appellate court, would be forced to trust completely and without reservation the discretion of the trial judge as to the propriety of his questions, his assessment of the veracity of the answers, and his entire judgment without ever knowing what was told to him. Such answers could well be the basis of his ruling.

¶14In addition, there would be no way for a party to ever contest, disprove, or argue on appeal about any statement or accusation, no matter how wild or false, that the child *1275 may have made (perhaps in his fancy)—unless he knows what the child said to the judge.

¶15Accordingly, we hold that the interview must be conducted in chambers outside of the presence of the parents, but in the presence of their attorneys, with a record being made by the court reporter. The judge shall first determine his competency as "a person of proper understanding" by interrogating the child with appropriate questions. The attorneys shall be allowed to participate in the competency examination by asking questions and registering appropriate but only necessary objections. If the judge determines that the child is not a competent witness as outlined above, he shall immediately terminate the interview.

¶16However, if the judge determines that the child is competent, he may continue the interview in the presence of the attorneys as observers only. They shall not participate by asking questions, or cross-examining or registering objections, as we deem this would upset, distract and possibly intimidate the child to a degree that would undermine his willingness to give any useful information.

¶17The above procedure is admittedly a compromise, but we deem it to the best interest of the child in the long run. It will protect the basic foundations of the adversary system, allow a record to be available for appeal, and may even save the child from being awarded to the wrong party should he indulge in fantasies that might not be detected by a trial judge, no matter how good his intentions were.

¶18We do not intend or direct that the above procedure is ordained or is mandatory when there is no objection from either side regarding the examination of any child by the judge. In such case, the trial judge may examine any child or witness in chambers, on or off the record, and with or without parents and/or counsel being present—provided all agree on the procedure.

¶19Accordingly, the writ is granted in part and denied in part; and the trial judge is instructed to conduct the interview in a manner consistent with the procedure outlined herein.

¶20GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

¶21KLIEBERT, Judge, concurring.

¶22I concur in the writer's conclusions as to the manner in which the examination of the minor of such tender years should be conducted, but not necessarily for the reasons stated.

NOTES

¶23[1] Chavigny v. Hava,125 La. 710, 51 So. 696 (1910); Wilson v. Moser,210 La. 1021, 29 So.2d 49 (1946); Legrand v. Legrand,455 So.2d 705 (La.App. 5th Cir.1984); rehearing denied; Duhe v. Duhe,451 So.2d 1198 (La.App. 5th Cir.1984); Harper v. Boudreaux,415 So.2d 648 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982); Duffie v. Duffie,387 So.2d 654 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980), writ refused; Vidrine v. Demourelle,363 So.2d 943 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978).

¶24[2] § 3665. Competency of witnesses

¶25The competent witness in any civil proceeding in court or before a person having authority to receive evidence shall be a person of proper understanding.

¶26[3] § 469. Understanding as test of competency; child under twelve years

¶27Understanding, and not age, must determine whether any person tendered as a witness shall be sworn; but no child less than twelve years of age shall, over the objection either of the district attorney or of the defendant, be sworn as a witness, until the court is satisfied, after examination, that such child has sufficient understanding to be a witness.

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