Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

463 F.2d 1185

Docket No. 71-2543.

Bialac v. Harsh Building Co.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided June 28, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1972.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1972-06-28

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Where a corporation is engaged in only one business activity, substantially all of whose operations occur in one state, even though policy and adminis trative decisions are made elsewhere, the state of operations is the corporation’s principal place of business.””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Bender v. HILTON RIVIERA CORPORATION, Industrial Tectonics, Inc. v. Alloy

“the evidence showed that really the only business activity of [that defendant] is owning and operating the Phoenix [Arizona] apartment complex which is the subject of this suit. Two of the plaintiffs are citizens of Arizona. Thus, we find at least one citizen of Arizona on each side of the case.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Kanzelberger v. F Kanzelberger G J

Relies on Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch · 315 F. Supp. 405 - Lurie Company v. Loew's San Francisco Hotel Corp.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1972-06-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently February 2009

12 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

1301972198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*1186John P. Frank (argued), Gerald K. Smith, R. A. Hillhouse, of Lewis & Roca, John J. Flynn, of Flynn, Kimerer, Thinnes & Galbraith, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellants.

¶2Newman Porter (argued), G. Starr Rounds, F. Pendleton Gaines, III, of Evans, Kitchell & Jenckes, Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Ariz., Hutchinson, Schwab & Burdick, Portland, Or., for appellees.

¶3Before CHAMBERS and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON* District Judge.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6The judgment is reversed. We conclude that we must find there was a lack of diversity of citizenship. Of course, it is tragic when we come up with such a result after the case has gone through a long trial.

¶7Here, the parties stipulated at the outset that one of the defendants, Harsh Building Corporation, has its principal place of business in Oregon. Later the evidence showed that really the only business activity of Harsh Building Corporation is owning and operating the Phoenix apartment complex which is the subject of this suit. Two of the plaintiffs are citizens of Arizona. Thus, we find at least one citizen of Arizona on each side of the case.

¶8An objection to jurisdiction based on lack of complete diversity between the parties in a lawsuit is never waived, nor is it lost by stipulation. Cf. Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1961). Where a corporation is engaged in only one business activity, substantially all of whose operations occur in one state, even though policy and administrative decisions are made elsewhere, the state of operations is the corporation’s principal place of business. Lurie Co. v. Loew’s San Francisco Hotel Corp., 315 F.Supp. 405 (N.D.Cal.1970).

¶9In equity there is not much to be said for sustaining the plaintiffs’ (appellants’) position. But jurisdiction is jurisdiction, so we must remand with directions to send the case back to the state court.

/463/f2d/1185 · .json · Public domain