463 So. 2d 542 - Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for each of the crimes for which defendant was convicted because the multiple offenses arose out of a single episode. He relies on Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983) as support for that position. While Palmer did reverse the imposition of consecutive mandatory minimum sentences in that case because the separate robbery victims were all robbed at the same time and place, the court specifically observed that it was not prohibiting consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for offenses arising from separate incidents occurring at separate times and places. 438 So.2d at 4 . Here, each crime was separate, occurring after a distinct time interval. Each sexual battery occurred at a different place. The intent to commit the robbery does not appear to have been formed until long after the sexual batteries took place. The shooting of the dog, however, does appear to be the direct continuation of the burglary, committed as soon as defendant entered the premises, so under Palmer , it would be error to impose mandatory minimum sentences for both of these crimes. Otherwise, we find no error in the imposition of the sentences.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 487 So. 2d 1088 - Smith v. State

2. “* * * The accused, guilty or innocent, is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the mind of every juror until every element of the offense charged against him has been proved by competent evidence adduced upon the trial beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not accomplished when a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction at the hands of that juror. * * * It is not enough that an opinion will readily yield to the evidence, for evidence of innocence is not required to be presented by the accused. We think the true test to be applied should be not whether the juror will yield his opinion, bias or prejudice to the evidence, but should be that whether he is free of such opinion, prejudice or bias or, whether he is infected by opinion, bias or prejudice, he will, nevertheless, be able to put such completely out of his mind and base his verdict only upon evidence given at the trial. Lamb v. State, [ 90 Fla. 844 ], 107 So. 530 , supra, at page 535, citing Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430 , 7 S.Ct. 614 , 30 L.Ed. 708 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 501 So. 2d 41 - Auriemme v. State

3. “It is error for a court to force a party to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause since it has the effect of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 894 So. 2d 88 - Busby v. State