United States v. Rucker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate · 5 district · 23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A delay of over one year between arrest and trial raises a Sixth Amendment claim of ‘prima facie merit.’ Hedgepeth v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 291 , 364 F.2d 684 (1966). It places on the Government the necessity of justification, the burden of which increases with the length of the delay. Id. at 687. When the delay approaches a year and a half as in this case, the Government must provide a justification which convincingly outweighs the prejudice which can normally be assumed to have been caused the defendant.” See also: United States v. Hines, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 249 , 455 F.2d 1317 (1972).”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Ariegwe · State v. Kipp

2. ““If the conviction is to be affirmed, rather, it must be on the ground that appellant was not significantly prejudiced by the delay in bringing his case to trial. Considering the circumstances in light of Supreme Court precedent, we' conclude that there is present here a ‘reasonable possibility of significant prejudice.’ United States v. Holt, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 185 , 448 F.2d 1108 (1971). Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 [, 92 S.Ct. 292 , 30 L.Ed.2d 257 ] (1971)””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 353 F. Supp. 1235 - United States v. Perry · United States v. Brown

3. “1. “First, the possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.” Id. 2. “Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the duration of his present imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions under which he must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by the pendency of another criminal charge outstanding against him.” Id. 3. “And while it might be argued that a person already in prison would be less likely than others to be affected by ‘anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation,’ there is reason to believe that an outstanding untried charge (of which even a convict may, of course, be innocent) can have fully as depressive an effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large.” Id. at 379 [ 89 S.Ct. at 577 ]. 4. “Finally, it is self-evident that ‘the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself’ are markedly increased when the accused is incarcerated.... [W]hile ‘evidence and witnesses disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective,’ a man isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts to mitigate these erosive effects of the passage of time.” Id. at 379-80 [ 89 S.Ct. at 577-80 ] (footnote omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Scott