Conaway v. State Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional, or part of the [Maryland] Rules. There are a host of principles in aid of divining legislative intent. Every analysis begins with asking whether the relevant statutory scheme evinces a plain meaning. We read the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis may end. However, when the language of the statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous.... In parsing whether plain meaning or ambiguity is the case, we view the relevant statutory scheme as a whole, rather than seizing a single provision.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 242 Md. App. 1 - David A. v. Karen S. · 242 Md. App. 90 - Brendoff v. State

2. “(d) Options after hearing. - If, at the hearing, a circuit court or the District Court finds that the probationer or defendant has violated a condition of probation, the court may: (1) revoke the probation granted or the suspension of sentence; and (2)(i) subject to subsection (3) of this section, for a technical violation , impose a period of incarceration of: 1. not more than 15 days for a first technical violation; 2. not more than 30 days for a second technical violation; and 3. not more than 45 days for a third technical violation; and (ii) for a fourth or subsequent technical violation or a violation that is not a technical violation, impose any sentence that might have originally been imposed for the crime of which the probationer or defendant was convicted or pleaded nolo contendere.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 242 Md. App. 90 - Brendoff v. State

3. “We read 'the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.' " Conaway v. State , 464 Md. 505 , 522-23, 212 A.3d 348 , No. 69, Sept. Term 2018, 2019 WL 3024706 , at (July 11, 2019) (quoting Ingram v. State , 461 Md. 650 , 661, 197 A.3d 14 (2018) ). "In parsing whether plain meaning or ambiguity is the case, we view the relevant statutory scheme as a whole, rather than seizing on a single provision.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 242 Md. App. 1 - David A. v. Karen S.