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← 466 F.3d 1276 - Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County

Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County’s Empirical Analysis

466 F.3d 1276 · 2006

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
August 2022
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 5 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently August 2022 · most notably Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island (2008), Pacific Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach (2013)

11 federal appellate · 5 district ·

260200620102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (§ 801 of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968)) · 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (§ 804 of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968))

Relies on Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. · Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust · James v. Valtierra · National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham · Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““First, it may be inappropriate to rely on absolute numbers rather than on proportional statistics. Second, statistics based on the general population [should] bear a proven relationship to the actual [population at issue]. Third, the appropriate inquiry is into the impact on the total group to which a policy or decision applies.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(1) Failing to accept or consider a bona fide offer because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. (2) Refusing to sell or rent a dwelling to, or to negotiate for the sale or rental of a dwelling with, any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. (3) Imposing different sales prices or rental charges for the sale or rental of a dwelling upon any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. (4) Using different qualification criteria or applications, or sale or rental standards or procedures, such as income standards, application requirements, application fees, credit analysis or sale or rental approval , procedures or other requirements, because of race, color, religion, sex,' handicap, familial status, or national origin. (5) Evicting tenants because of their race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin or because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of a tenant’s guest.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[A] plaintiff may demonstrate intentional discrimination if the 'decision-making body acted for the sole purpose of effectuating the desires of private citizens ... and [the] members of the decision-making body were aware of the motivations of private citizens.'”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.