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← 467 F.3d 56 - United States v. Johnson

United States v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

467 F.3d 56 · 2006

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
3
states following
September 2021
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 8 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently September 2021 · most notably United States v. Robison (2007), United States v. Davis (2016)

15 federal appellate · 8 district · 3 state decisions

190200620102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 33 U.S.C. § 1311

Relies on Gregg v. Georgia · Furman v. Georgia · Miller v. California · Marks v. United States · Alexander v. Sandoval

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “‘Maries is workable — one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “[Wjetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as “navigable.” When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or insubstan tial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[Kennedy’s] test is narrower (so far as reining in federal authority is concerned) than the plurality’s in most cases, though not in all because Justice Kennedy also said that “by saying the Act covers wetlands (however remote) possessing a surface-water connection with a continuously flowing stream (however small), the plurality’s reading would permit applications of the statute as far from traditional federal authority as are the waters it deems beyond the statute’s reach.” Thus, any conclusion that Justice Kennedy reaches in favor of federal authority over wetlands in a future case will command the support of five Justices (himself and the four dissenters), and in most cases in which he concludes that there is no federal authority he will command five votes (himself plus the four Justices in the Rapanos plurality), the exception being a case in which he would vote against federal authority only to be outvoted 8-to-l ... because there was a slight surface hydrological connection. The plurality’s insistence that the issue of federal authority be governed by strict rules will on occasion align the Justices in the plurality with the Rapa-nos dissenters when the balancing approach of Justice Kennedy favors the landowner. But that will be a rare case, so as a practical matter the Kennedy concurrence is the least common denominator (always, when his view favors federal authority).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.