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← 467 Pa. 476 - Commonwealth v. Palmer

Commonwealth v. Palmer’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
1
states following
May 2009
most recently cited

14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently May 2009

14 state decisions

801976198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Commonwealth v. Blair · Commonwealth v. Sisak · Commonwealth v. Bailey · Commonwealth v. Williams · Commonwealth v. Boyd

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “". . . The use of deadly force in protection of self is justifiable where certain requirements are met, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 C.P.S.A. § 505(a) and (b)(2) [effective date June 6, 1973] . . . but such use of force is disallowed, even though it is otherwise allowable because such requirements are met, where `The [defendant] knows he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating. . . .'" (Emphasis supplied in Commonwealth v. Palmer . ) "18 C.P.S.A. § 505(b)(2)(ii). Thus, the use of deadly force, otherwise allowable, is disallowed only where the defendant knows an avenue of retreat is available. (Emphasis in original.) ". . . As applied instantly, if Palmer believed he was `cornered' or without an avenue of retreat, it necessarily follows that he did not know an avenue of retreat was available and thus, he would have been excused from retreating and justified in using deadly force if the other requirements were present. However, according to the trial court's instructions if an avenue of retreat in fact existed, Palmer would have had the duty to retreat even though he did not know such an avenue of retreat was available. The jury under the testimony may have believed retreat was in fact available and still have believed Palmer did not know it was because he believed it was not. As such, the jury may have disallowed the justifiable use of deadly force by Palmer by applying an improper standard."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “. . . The use of deadly force in protection of self is justifiable where certain requirements are met, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 C.P.S.A. § 505(a) and (b)(2) [effective date June 6, 1973] . . . but such use of force is disallowed, even though it is otherwise allowable because such requirements are met, where `The [defendant] knows he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating. . . .'”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.