Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 468 F.2d 522 - Hoellen v. Annunzio

Hoellen v. Annunzio’s Empirical Analysis

468 F.2d 522 · 1972

Citation profile

25
cited by 25 later decisions
3
states following
December 2008
most recently cited

7 federal appellate · 3 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently December 2008 · most notably 17 Cal. 3d 206 - Stanson v. Mott (1976), Alfred D. Schiaffo, in No. 72-2168 v. Henry Helstoski, in No. 72-2167 (1974)

7 federal appellate · 3 district · 5 state decisions

1201972198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1339 · 39 U.S.C. § 3201 · 39 U.S.C. § 3210 · 39 U.S.C. § 3216

Relies on Baker v. Carr · United States v. Brewster · Fletcher v. Peck · Weisberg v. Powell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[T]he thrust of Brewster requires us to regard [the] use of the frank to mail materials in this case as outside the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause. Mailings of items such as newsletters may well be necessary if a congressman is conscientiously to perform his legislative tasks. But Brewster makes it clear that the immunity of the Speech and Debate Clause does not extend to a number of legitimate legislative activities, and we would include among such activities the mailing of materials under the frank. “5. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a four-member majority of the Supreme Court, stated that: “It is well known, of course, that members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. These include a wide range of legitimate ‘errands’ performed for constituents, the making of appointments with government agencies, assistance in securing government contracts, preparing so-called ‘newsletters’ to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The range of these related activities has grown over the years. They are performed in part because they have come to be expected by constituents, and because they are a means of developing continuing support for future elections. Although these are entirely legitimate activities, they are political in nature rather than legislative, in the sense that term has been used by the court in prior cases. But it has never been ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[A] narrow standard that would preclude consideration of any evidence except the contents of the mailing itself would be unreliable and, indeed, would not avoid consideration of the sender’s motive, in the extreme case, the text of a letter — perhaps an overt plea for financial support in a partisan election— would reveal an unofficial purpose. In other cases, the contents might be neutral or ambiguous — perhaps a check or a simple affirmative reply — and additional evidence would be needed to determine whether the mailing served an official or an unofficial purpose: To whom was the letter sent? For what expense was the check a payment? Extrinsic evidence of the sender’s motive would clearly be relevant to the question whether such a mailing was “official business.” This case falls into a different category. Inquiry limited to the contents of the mailing would indicate an official purpose. For certainly it is appropriate for a Congressman to solicit the views of his constituents on issues of public importance. But if we may go beyond the contents of the letter to ascertain the character of an ambiguous mailing, logic dictates that we should not close our eyes in the face of extrinsic evidence which reveals that an appearance of official business is nothing more than a mask for a private purpose.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The Brewster decision is decisive of this issue. In holding that the Speech and Debate Clause did not immunize Senator Brewster from prosecution on federal bribery charges, the Supreme Court distinguished between Congressional conduct which is clearly part of the legislative process — such as voting, speaking on the floor or conducting a legislative hearing — and conduct which is incidentally related to the legislative process The Court confined the protections of the Clause to the former and specifically included the conduct with which we are concerned in the latter In light of this language, there can be no doubt that the activities at issue in this cases, sending out documents and questionnaires to constituents and others, while “entirely legitimate activities” related to the legislative process, are not ‘purely legislative activities’ protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. Therefore no doctrine of legislative immunity precludes judicial inquiry into the legality of Congressman Annunzio’s use of the frank in this case, even if that inquiry necessitates a consideration of his motives in making the mailings.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.